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ABSTRACT
On May 25, 1993 the United Nations established a war crimes tribunal at The
Hague for the former Yugoslavia— the first such institution since Nuremberg. As the
Hague Tribunal gathers evidence and hears cases, every aspect of its establishment,
structure, and mode of operation is being compared to the Nuremberg International
Military Tribunal (IMT). Many people expect that the principles used to convict the
accused at Nuremberg will be just as successfully applied at the Hague Tribunal.
However, the cases differ in two important ways.
The first difference concerns the factors that drove the establishment of the two
events. The motives behind the creation of the IMT tribunal were largely political, while
in the former Yugoslavia, though a limited political agenda exists, legal considerations
have been paramount.
The second difference concerns the framework of applicable law. Nuremberg
defendants were prosecuted in an ex-post facto manner whereas at the Hague Tribunal,
due to codification of war crimes laws since the IMT, the prosecution is required to
produce definitive evidence in order to gain conviction.
Despite such differences, the Hague Tribunal proceedings are building on the
Nuremberg precedent. Just as Nuremberg formed a milestone in the fusing of
international law with fundamental moral principles, the Hague Tribunal will likely take
this process a step further with the establishment of a permanent international criminal
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Kill a man, and you are an assassin. Kill millions of men, and you are a
conqueror. Kill everyone, and you are a god.
Jean Rostand (1939)
You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty, and
you cannot refine it.
William Tecumseh Sherman (1864)
All too often the world has tended to view wars only in terms of causes and
effects. With little attention to legal and moral ramifications, many have classified
conflicts in terms of the winners and the losers. Lost is the unwarranted destruction that
wars brought the innocent; what mattered most, above all else, was victory. 1 Until
contemporary history not only were the rights of a sovereign nation to go to war, jus ad
bellum, rarely questioned, but the constraints on the conduct of war, jus in bello, were
largely ignored. Committing crimes during war was rarely recognized as unlawful.
Nevertheless, there have been exceptions. In the Book of Joshua, soldiers during biblical
times were executed for transgressing certain implicit rules of warfare, like looting
conquered cities. Additional constraints attached to the conduct of war, though limited,
were largely shaped by the Christian ethic as defined by the Catholic Church of the
Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The Church established principles that still hold true
today. War must be waged by a legitimate authority and for a just cause — for example,
1 Norman E. Tutorow, War Crimes, War Criminals, and War Crimes Trials (New York: Greenwood
Publishing Group, 1986), 3; See also Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994),
245.
to make reparations for an injury or to restore what had been wrongly seized. There had
to be reasonable prospect for victory, and every attempt to resolve the matter by peaceful
means must have been exhausted. 2 The Age of Enlightenment gave rise to the idea that
while armies might clash, innocent civilians should not be harmed. Napoleon adopted
codes prohibiting the execution of prisoners of war and the wanton destruction of civilian
property. The Union Army adopted a code of conduct during the Civil War. The Union
tried and executed the commandant of the Confederate prison camp at Andersonville for
war crimes. The Declaration of St. Petersburg (1868) was signed by the major European
powers to prevent the unnecessary suffering of civilians during war. 3 Influenced heavily
by the works of the Dutch scholar and statesman Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), who
founded international law in the seventeenth century and was appalled by the carnage of
the Thirty Years' War, the first comprehensive codification of the international law of
war was accomplished by the First Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes (1899) and the Hague Convention (IV) on the Laws and Customs
ofWar(1907).4
Though such a thing as the unlawful conduct of warfare was recognized by many
nations, laws were poorly codified and applied in a discriminatory manner. Countries
rarely prosecuted for fear of escalating hostilities. Therefore, following the end of
hostilities, it was customary for an amnesty to be extended to all combatants accused of
2 Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, eds., The Laws of War: Constraints on
Warfare in the Western World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 2-4.
3
This agreement regulated only small projectiles and applied to only the seventeen signatory states.
4
Margaret M. Lee, "Bosnia War Crimes: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
and U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 96-404F (1996): 40; Tutorow,
War Crimes, War Criminals and War Crimes Trials, 3.
war crimes. 5 However, as warfare increased in destructiveness with the industrial
revolution,6 it became apparent that responsibility for the conduct of war between states
be more clearly established. 7 As it happened, two world wars had to occur before any
significant measures were adopted.
Chapter I of this study discusses the evolution of the law of war and provides the
framework that seeks to relativize the notion that absolute parallels can be drawn between
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) and the International War Crimes
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Hague Tribunal). 8 Chapter II explores the history of
the IMT and the formation of the Hague Tribunal. This background is essential in order
to appreciate the settings and circumstances accompanying the formation of each tribunal.
Chapter III examines the principles set forth at Nuremberg and how they have been
integrated into present-day international criminal law. Chapter IV explains why the
Hague Tribunal cannot be another IMT, chiefly because of two outstanding differences
between them: the first concerns the factors that drove their implementation. The
motives for the creation of Nuremberg were derived from great power politics. The
victors of World War II -the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France -
established an "international tribunal" without consulting other states. Furthermore, at
Nuremberg, precedents established by both positive and natural law were often ignored
5 Matthew Lippman, "Nuremberg: Forty-Five Years Later," Connecticut Journal of International Law,
Volume 7:1 (fall 1991): 2-3.
6 Modern military technologies such as trench warfare, machine guns, and chemical weapons shattered old
ideas about the "honor" of battle.
7 During the twentieth century, four times as many civilians have been the victims of war crimes and
crimes against humanity than the number of soldiers killed in all conflicts combined. See Michael P.
Scharf, Balkan Justice (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1997), xiii and Rudi J. Rummel, Death by
Government (New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Publishers, 1994), 9.
8
Officially "The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
by the victors. These motives are not present at the Hague Tribunal. Though a limited
political agenda exists, it is overshadowed by a highly detailed legal approach. The
second difference concerns the framework of applicable law. Nuremberg defendants
were prosecuted in an ex-post facto manner, meaning that many of the laws used to
convict the Nazi leaders had not yet been formulated. This differs from the current
tribunal, where, due to the codification of war crimes laws, the prosecution is required to
produce definitive evidence in order to gain conviction.
Finally, Chapter V speculates about the future. Though differences exist, the
Hague Tribunal proceedings are building on the Nuremberg precedent. Just as
Nuremberg was a milestone in the union of international law with fundamental moral
principles, the Hague Tribunal will likely take this process one step further with the
establishment of a permanent international criminal court.
A. BACKGROUND
The international community, beginning with large-scale Axis atrocities in World
War II and reinforced most recently by genocidal practices in the former Yugoslavia,
which resulted in the rape, torture and/or death of tens of thousands and displacement of
hundreds of thousands,9 has been moving from no recognizable differentiation between
just and unjust, or legal and illegal wars and towards enforcing international law for
offenses committed during wartime. This trend has culminated in the demand for
international ad hoc tribunals to try those accused of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia."
9 There is no reliable estimate on how many died, but refugee debriefs suggest tens of thousands with a
high end estimate of two million. The evidence is mostly anecdotal and not the result of formal
investigations or exhumations, since most deaths claimed took place in areas under Serb control to which
and Rwanda.
Though this trend has led to the unprecedented establishment of a United Nations
ad hoc tribunal sitting in judgment of the accused, there is nothing new, of course, in
prosecuting offenders against the laws and customs of war as reflected in national
military codes. For centuries military commanders, from Henry Vth of England, under his
famous ordinances of war in 1419, to the American military prosecution of soldiers
involved in the My Lai massacre (1968-9) under the United States Code of Military
Justice, have enforced such laws against violators. 10 However, the first modern attempt
to put into practice the idea of assigning international criminal responsibility to persons
guilty of crimes against humanity emerges at the end of World War I. 11 The Treaty of
Versailles provided for an ad hoc tribunal 12 in Leipzig (1921) to try the Sovereign, Kaiser
Wilhelm II, for war crimes. President Woodrow Wilson, however, felt that any war
crimes trial would do irreparable harm to the proposed League of Nations and to the
fragile Weimar Republic. The result was that the Treaty of Versailles indicted the Kaiser
not for war crimes but for "a supreme offense against international morality and the
sanctity of treaties." 13 These charges had so little basis in international law that the
access to outsiders was/is denied. Approximately 2,000,000 people have been displaced.
10 Theodor Meron, "The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs, Volume 72:3,
(summer 1993): 122-123.
11 The earliest recorded international tribunal dates back to the 1474 trial of the Burundian Governor of
Breisach, Peter von Hagenback, whose troops had raped and killed innocent civilians and pillaged their
property during the occupation of Breisach. Hagenback was found guilty of "crimes against the law of
God and humanity" before a court made up of twenty-eight judges from states of the Holy Roman Empire.
See Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, An Insiders Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, Volume I (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1995). Perhaps
the most famous ad-hoc tribunal was the 1810 Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle which tried and convicted
Napoleon Bonaparte for waging unjust wars, sentencing him to exile on Elba.
12 The 1919 Commission on the Responsibilities of Authors of the War and Enforcement of Penalties for
Violations of the Laws and Customs of War.
13 Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, article 227.
Dutch, who had custody of the Kaiser after he fled to the Netherlands, refused to turn him
over for trial on the grounds that the crimes were essentially a political offense, since it
was within the prerogatives of a head of state to decide to go to war. The Treaty of
Sevres, establishing the terms of peace with the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War
I, provided for the surrender by Turkey of persons accused of crimes "against the laws of
humanity" in the genocidal massacre of nearly 800,000 Armenians. 14 In 1937, the
League of Nations, of which the United States was not a member, ratified the
"Convention Against Terrorism," which had a protocol providing for the establishment of
a special international criminal court to prosecute crimes of terrorism. 15 Though the
world recognized the need to assign culpability to war criminals, the lack of an
international commitment up until Nuremberg prevented these and other treaties and
conventions from achieving any measurable success.
B. THE YUGOSLAV DILEMMA
The regime of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, in its vicious campaign to
conquer Muslim and Croatian territory in order to create a "Greater Serbia," was willing
to "countenance the most brutal behavior by man against man in Europe since Hitler's
attempt to exterminate the Jews." 16 The atrocities that occurred in the 1990s were not an
14
Prior to the outbreak of World War I, a group of military officers took power in Turkey aligning
themselves with Germany. During the course of the war, they drove Armenians into resettlement camps,
raped their women, placed the men in labor camps, while expelling others into the desert, where they died
of starvation and exposure. After the war, a Turkish military court convicted only two officials, hanging
one. But no international trials were ever held — genocide was not yet considered an international crime
— and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) granted amnesty to the killers as the part of the price of the division
of the Ottoman Empire. See Tina Rosenberg, "Tipping the Scales of Justice," World Policy Journal,
Volume 12:3, (fall 1995): 57.
15 This Convention was, ironically, adopted in response to nationalistic acts of terrorism in the Balkans.
See Lee, "Bosnia War Crimes," 40-41
.
16
Francis Boyle, The Bosnian People Charge Genocide: Proceedings at the International Court ofJustice
isolated episode, or the result of only recent events. Though ethnic conflict has occurred
in the Balkan region for hundreds of years, it is important to note that the violence that
took place fifty years earlier, during World War II, contributed greatly to the recent
conflict.
In April 1941, Nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia, creating a puppet state called
the Independent State of Croatia. 17 Croatian Nationalists, known as the Ustashi, under the
direction of the Nazis initiated a violent campaign to rid Yugoslavia of all persons of
Serbian origin and create a homogenous nation of Croatians. 18 With the defeat of Nazi
Germany, the Croatian Army was forced to surrender and Yugoslavia came under the rule
of Josip Tito. Despite being a half-Croat, half-Slovenian, he considered himself above all
a communist who envisioned that national and ethnic rivalries, like class distinctions,
would eventually fade from everyone's collective memory. Under his firm leadership,
the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia enjoyed a relatively long period of
unification and peace. After his death in 1980, he was replaced by a collective leadership
that failed to provide a unifying force needed to maintain the Republic. 19 It was thus
easy, in the depressed economic climate of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, for leaders like
Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia to reopen the wounds of
not only World War II, but of previous centuries.
Not since the end of World War II and the revelation of the horrors of Nazi
Concerning Bosnia v. Serbia on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide (Amherst, MA:
Aletheia Press, 1996), foreword.
17 See Charles L. Nier III, "The Yugoslavian Civil War: An Analysis of the Applicability of the Laws of
War Governing Non-International Armed Conflicts in the Modern World," Dickinson Journal of
International Law, Volume 10:2 (winter 1992): 303-308.
18 An a result of this ethnic cleansing, an estimated 750,000 persons were murdered.
19
Nier, "The Yugoslavian Civil War," 309.
Germany has Europe confronted evidence of genocide. 20 As a result, amidst the reports
of war crimes and atrocities committed by all participants,21 but most notably by Serbs,22
the United Nations Security Council on May 25 1993, established the Hague Tribunal—
the first such body since those at Nuremberg and Tokyo.23 Spurred by this, both
government and private organizations compiled detailed documentary and eyewitness
evidence of at least 5,000 specific cases, along with lists of over 3,500 named individuals,
extending to the upper echelons of the political and military establishments, allegedly
responsible for committing the crimes. 24 In response to the deliberate, systematic, and
flagrant violations of the human rights and humanitarian norms, Western opinion became
the driving impetus for not only the creation, but the sustainment, of the Hague Tribunal,
in the hope that the justice handed down to those responsible for the war crimes and
genocidal practices in the former Yugoslavia would mirror both the process and decisions
reached at Nuremberg.
20
Francis Boyle, The Bosnian People Charge Genocide: Proceedings at the International Court ofJustice
Concerning Bosnia v. Serbia on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime ofGenocide (Amherst, MA:
Aletheia Press, 1996), 4.
21 Evidence has revealed torture, summary executions, internment in concentration camps reminiscent of
Nazi Germany, systematic mass rape and forced prostitution, inhuman treatment of prisoners and civilians,
and destruction or confiscation of private property, especially Muslim mosques, not justified by military
necessity.
22 Although the media has vilified the Serbs, the Croats have also committed substantial war crimes. Croat
extremists in Bosnia-Herzegovina carried out a brutal ethnic cleansing campaign against the Muslims
during their 1993-94 war in a drive to create an ethnically pure Croat state that could be united with
Croatia. There are also reports of war crimes committed by Muslims, albeit far fewer than those
committed by the other two groups.
3 For background on the Tokyo war crimes trials, see Arnold Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The
Untold Story ofthe Tokyo War Crimes Trials (New York: William Morrow & Co, 1988); John R. Pritchard
and Sonia Magbanua Zaide, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: Index and Guide (New York: Garland
Publications, 1987); Richard H. Minear, Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971) and B.V.A. Roling and Antonio Cassese, ed., The Tokyo Trial
and Beyond: Reflections ofa Peacemonger (Oxford, England: Blackwell Publications, 1995).
24 James O. Jackson, "No Rush to Judgment," Time, 27 June 1994, 48.
C. A DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION
The wrongs which we seek to condemn andpunish have been so calculated,
so malignant and so devastating that civilization cannot tolerate their being
ignored because it cannot survive their being repeated/'-'
The preceding quote by United States Supreme Court Justice and Nuremberg
Prosecutor Robert H. Jackson could have very well opened the proceedings to the Hague
Tribunal in the former Yugoslavia instead of Nuremberg in 1945. With our penchant for
the commemoration of past events, especially such milestones as fiftieth anniversaries (as
was the case of the Nuremberg trials when the Hague Tribunal moved from an
administrative to a judicial process), it is hardly surprising comparisons are being made
between the hearings before The Hague and those at Nuremberg. A second, though no
less important reason, that simple comparisons are being drawn between the two tribunals
stems from the universal abhorrence of genocide. The Holocaust was a planned attempt
by Hitler and the Nazis to exterminate European Jews and eradicate every vestige of their
culture. The mass media has made it easy to identify the systematic killing of Jews, Poles
and others in World War II to the policies of ethnic cleansing by the Serbs. 26 Though the
scale of atrocities committed in World War II Germany differ significantly from the
massacre of Croats and Muslims in the former Yugoslavia genocide, no matter the scale,
it is still genocide. Therefore popular opinion is quick to relate these two tragic events.
As a result, those making these comparisons expect the same justice that was successful
at Nuremberg to prevail at The Hague.
In essence then, as the Hague Tribunal gathers evidence and hears cases, every
25
Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1992),
167.
aspect of its establishment, structure, and mode of operation will have comparisons to the
precedents established over fifty years ago in Nuremberg. 27 Expectations are that the
principles used for the conviction of defendants at Nuremberg will be just as applicable to
those currently awaiting trial at The Hague. The authors of the accords hope that the
Hague Tribunal will be the first step in a long process to help defuse ethnic tensions and
assist in the peacemaking process by bringing to justice those responsible for the most
heinous acts — just as the Nuremberg trials did for Europe. As a result, many policy
makers, members of the press, and human rights groups cannot help but make
comparisons between the two tribunals. 28 Are the similarities as genuine as they appear?
Did both tribunals confront similar challenges? Or did the creation of each tribunal give
rise to unique problems? How much of a substantive legal, political, and moral basis
does the Nuremberg experience provide for the Hague Tribunal?
This thesis contrasts the Hague Tribunal with the IMT and seeks to dispel the
notion that the same legal, political, and moral principles that were applied to the Nazi
leaders and organizations for determination of guilt can be applied to the war criminals in
the former Yugoslavia. In addition, it considers what precedents, if any, the decisions
reached by the Hague Tribunal may set with regard to the establishment of a permanent
international criminal court. 29
26 Michael Berenbaum, ed., A Mosaic of Victims: Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis (New
York: New York University Press, 1990), xi.
27 Jeremy Colwill, "From Nuremberg to Bosnia and Beyond: War Crimes Trials in the Modern Era," Social
Justice, Volume 22:3 (fall 1995): 1 12.
28 For a comprehensive overview of potential pitfalls when making historical comparisons, see Ernest R.
May and Richard E. Neustradt, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York:
Free Pr., 1988). Mays and Neustradt analyze political disasters and successes of recent decades to provide
lessons on how to use history to improve decision-making.
29 A permanent international criminal court would not replace the existing International Court of Justice
10
D. THE NUREMBERG IMT AND THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL: THE PRINCIPAL
DIFFERENCES
Simple comparisons can be dangerous. The events that led to the creations and
internationally recognized legitimacies of the Nuremberg IMT and the Hague Tribunal
are markedly different.
1. Basis of Creation
The first difference between the two tribunals concerns the factors that drove their
establishment. The IMT arose in the aftermath of a horrific and all-encompassing global
war in which both the Allies and Axis committed atrocities, but after which only the
vanquished were prosecuted. The motives for the creation ofNuremberg were mainly the
result of a politically driven process controlled by the United States which insisted that
"we [the Allies] will declare what international law is...."30 Charges of a politically
driven process are supported by the exclusivity of those participating in the IMT's
formation, the disregard for existing international positive law and principles and the
failure to seek the endorsement of the wider international community with a multilateral
treaty.
31 These shortcomings served to strengthen the hands of those castigating the
proceedings as "political" or "show" trials. 32 These charges are not the case with the
prosecution of war criminals in the former Yugoslavia. Though a political agenda
(ICJ), but instead complement it. Currently the ICJ, the long-standing judicial arm of the U.N., adjudicates
only cases arising between states. A permanent criminal court would have jurisdiction over the offenses of
individuals.
30 Robert H. Jackson, "Report of Robert H. Jackson United States Representative to the International
Conference on Military Trials," Minutes of the Conference Session, July 29, 1945," State Department
Publication 3080 (1949), 97, 99.
31 Legal standards (as evidenced in the lack of an appeals process, trials held in abstentia, and the
defendants' limited access to prosecutory evidence) were, at best, a secondary consideration.
32
Colwill, "From Nuremberg to Bosnia," 113, 115.
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arguably does exist (focused not so much on the actual trials as on the outcome of the
Hague Tribunal being used to create a permanent international criminal court), it is
overshadowed by a highly refined legal approach. Because of the Hague Tribunal's
required adherence to (and respect for) the norms of customary international law, the
standards for the determination of culpability and the finding of guilt for the accused are
vastly much higher than at Nuremberg. As a result, the likelihood that the proceedings
will be politically influenced by an organization outside of the United Nations are remote.
2. Framework of Applicable Law
The second major difference between Nuremberg IMT and the Hague Tribunal
concerns the framework of applicable law, or "victor's justice," as some commentators
have called it. Unlike the prosecution of Nazi war criminals, the application of
international law to the former Yugoslavia does not involve a vanquished nation or the
administration of justice by an occupying power. 33 The war in the former Yugoslavia
ended not by force leading to surrender, but through diplomacy resulting in a negotiated
and nominally agreed upon settlement at Dayton. 34
The presumption that "victor's justice" may be intrinsically biased and
illegitimate is best expressed in the maxim nullem crime sine lege, nulla poena sine lege
- that is, there can be no crime and subsequently no punishment without a pre-existing
law. In other words, defendants should not be prosecuted in an ex-post facto manner on
" Kevin R. Chaney, "Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War
Crimes Trials," Dickinson Journal ofComparative International Law (fall 1995): 58.
34 Cedric Thornberry, "Saving the War Crimes Tribunal," Foreign Policy (fall 1996): 74.
12
35the basis of retrospective legislation, which is precisely what occurred at Nuremberg.
Was "launching an aggressive war" and the commission of "crimes against humanity"
actually criminal activity punishable under international law, or merely "sonorous phrases
used by the victors to cloak their purging of Nazi Germany?"36 If international law
lacked codification and legitimacy, under what law, then, could the German leaders be
prosecuted?37
International prohibitions on waging aggressive wars and crimes against humanity
had not yet been invented or, as in the cases of the Covenant of the League of Nations of
1919 and Kellogg-Briand Pact (Pact of Paris) of 1928,38 the laws were so ambiguous that
an extremely liberal interpretation would have been required for the indictment and
prosecution of war criminals. Undaunted by the lack of any significant positive law or
precedents, the Nuremberg Tribunal chose to "invent" the laws and guidelines that were
required to prosecute the accused, thereby ensuring "victor's justice."
Conviction of the Nazis as practitioners of genocide under the charge of "crimes
against humanity" proved somewhat less difficult. Questions confronting the framers of
the IMT arose whether "crimes against humanity" under article VI(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter39 existed under a combination of sources of international law, namely
35
Colwill, "From Nuremberg to Bosnia," 129.
36 Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1977), xiv.
17 Some legal scholars would argue that the German leaders could have been prosecuted under the 1907
Hague Conventions. They represented the beginning of the international legal recognition of war
crimes/crimes against humanity. Arguably, the most important was Hague Convention IV, Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, which codified the principles of war and established an international
normative core for the Nuremberg trials.
38 The Allies had to be careful not to be accused of tu quoque evidence (meaning "if I am guilty, so are
you"). They proceeded with trepidation with regards to Kellogg-Briand as the Soviet Union could be






conventions, custom, and general principles of law. The conclusion was that since
"crimes against humanity" had not been part of treaty law, the Allies "subscribed to a
liberal interpretation of the principles of legality in hopes of avoiding the criticism of
enacting ex post facto legislation."40 In addition, the "overwhelming and damning
evidence of the Nazis' vast scale of racial and religious persecution eliminated concern
about ex post facto claims. 41 Codifications in positive law since Nuremberg make
similar questions mute for at The Hague. Nonetheless, challenges to convict on charges
of genocide confront the Hague Tribunal. Documentation recovered at the end of World
War II provided clear evidence that genocide was systematically coordinated and
approved at all levels of the German government. The 1948 Genocide Convention
requires that in order for genocide to exist, it must be organized or approved by the
government. This has the potential to pose problems in the former Yugoslavia where the
lack of documentation and hard evidence may make it difficult to prove government
40 Though the application of ex post facto justice at Nuremberg has been acknowledged by many legal
scholars concerning charges of Germany waging an "aggressive war", similar accusations are nearly
impossible to level against the "crimes against humanity" charge. The rationale for "crimes against
humanity" was predicated on a theory of jurisdictional extension of the "war crimes" charge. The
reasoning was that war crimes applied to certain protected persons, namely civilians, during war between
states, and "crimes against humanity" merely extended the same "war crimes" proscriptions to the same
category of protected persons within a particular state, provided it is linked to the initiation and conduct of
"war crimes." As a result of this interpretation, the IMT, in an attempt to avoid any potential criticism of
retroactive justice, did not recognize "crimes against humanity" committed before 1939. See M. Cherif
Bassiouni, "From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent
International Criminal Court," Harvard Human Rights Journal (spring 1997): 26. See also "Formulation
of the Nuremberg Principles," 1950 U.N.Y.B., 852-857; Bernard D. Meltzer, "'War Crimes': The
Nuremberg Trial and the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia," Valparaiso University Law Review,
Volume 30:3 (summer 1996): 900-901 and Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of
Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Opinion and Judgment, (Government Printing Office,
1947): 84.
41
"From Nuremberg to Bosnia: Consistent Application of International Law," Cleveland State Law Review,
Volume 42:705 (1994): 716. The closest argument that could be remotely considered application of
retroactive legislation involved the defense of Nazi labor leader Fritz Sauckel whose lawyer, Dr. Robert
Servatius, claimed that the IMT Charter did not clearly define certain crimes. See Taylor, The Anatomy of
the Nuremberg Trials, 428-29, 485.
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complicity in genocide.
E. THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL'S LEGAL FOUNDATION
In his commentary on the statute approved by the United Nations Security
Council for the creation of the Hague Tribunal, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
emphasized that the principle nullem crime sine lege requires that "the international
(Hague) Tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond
any doubt part of customary law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all
states to specific conventions does not arise."42 That "part of conventional international
humanitarian law which has beyond doubt become part of international customary law"43
is embodied in the codification of laws not only as the result of the Nuremberg Principles,
but also the 1948 Genocide Convention,44 the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the
Laws of War (Article 99 of the Geneva Convention III states: "No prisoner of war may be
tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or
by international law, in force at the time the said act was committed."),45 the 1 954 Hague
Convention on Cultural Property, the Additional Supplementary Protocols I and II of
1977,
46
and the 1984 Torture Convention,47 among others.48
42
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, Statute of
the International Tribunal, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Document S/25704. Reprinted in Morris and Scharf, An
Insiders Guide, 3.
43 Report of the Secretary-General, UN. Document S/25704.
44 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 1021.
45 Geneva Convention I: The Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
The Field, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention II: The Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention III: Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; and Geneva Convention IV: Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
46 Geneva Protocol I: Addition to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
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However, these codifications have created a double edged sword for the Hague
Tribunal. Because of the codification of war crime laws, prosecutors at The Hague are
being held to higher standards than their Nuremberg counterparts by being required to
produce definitive evidence in order to gain conviction. As a result, this codification and
adherence to a stricter legal standard have contributed significantly to the fact that the
Hague Tribunal has been slow to issue indictments, capture the accused, and bring them
to trial, let alone reach judgments in a timely fashion.
F. THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL AS PRECEDENT
Though there are significant differences between the two tribunals, the Hague
Tribunal may benefit from the IMT. Just as Nuremberg was a milestone that enriched
international positive law with principles that had long been discussed as forming part of
natural law, it is expected that the precedents established at The Hague will take human
rights one step further. It can be argued that the current Tribunal is important not only for
its capacity to adequately confront the events in the former Yugoslavia, but also in terms
of a growing perception that its success or failure will heavily influence the world's
ability to adopt measures that prevent a recurrence of these atrocities. One of the major
barriers to this goal has been the conflict between state sovereignty and the jurisdiction of
such a tribunal. 49 These concerns may abate if The Hague is successful. 50 If the Hague
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Geneva Protocol
II: Addition to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1 125 U.N.T.S. 609.
47 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A.
Resolution 39, U.N. GAOR, 39 Session, Supplement No. 51, U.N. Document A/39/708, 1984.
48 Theodor Meron, "War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law," American
Journal of International Law (January 1994): 79.
49
States naturally have been hesitant to expose their citizens (most notably their politicians and military
commanders) to international prosecution for conduct undertaken in the name of the state. The is explored
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Tribunal is perceived as functioning fairly, then a case for establishing a permanent
international war crimes court will be strengthened.
G. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION
What value, both in a political and legal framework and for the military
intelligence community, is gained by the comparison of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg with the Hague Tribunal? First, despite the agreements reached at
Dayton (1995), involvement in the Balkans may well continue to dominate both United
States and Western European political and military decision making for the foreseeable
future because of the violent and destructive acts that have been perpetrated since the late
1980s. The legal decisions reached by the Hague Tribunal will have consequences for
such policies. Furthermore, the reaffirmation of the principles of accountability
established at Nuremberg might well go a long way toward deterring those involved in
the "next Yugoslavia" from committing crimes against humanity. As for the intelligence
community, it is important to recognize the danger of drawing parallels. All too often the
intelligence community conveniently places issues inside "boxes" that can be neatly
"stacked together" to build explanations to support the intended analysis. This thesis will
demonstrate the dangers of making such convenient associations. If simple comparisons
are drawn between the two tribunals, dangerous expectations of applying the same criteria
for guilt at The Hague as at Nuremberg may lead not only to disappointment in the West
with the perceived ineffectiveness of the tribunal, but more importantly to a situation
by Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (New York: New York Times
Company, 1970).
50 Roger S. Clark and Madeleine Sann, eds., The Prosecution of International Crimes: A Study of the
International Tribunalfor theformer Yugoslavia (London: Transaction Publications, 1996), 164.
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where the aggrieved parties in the former Yugoslavia become dubious of seeing justice
done through the tribunal — leading to a renewal of conflict outside the courtroom. As
this leads to a general breakdown of the Dayton Accords, the ramifications for the United
States, the key power for stability in the region, are potentially enormous.
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II. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRIBUNALS
When blood is spilled, it is the responsibility of those who spill it, and the
responsibility of those who could have stopped its spilling.
Weston Kosova(1994) 51
The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do
nothing.
Edmund Burke (1770)
A. THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT NUREMBERG
Nazi ideology promoted the ideal of war to restore German greatness in Europe.
The Nazi credo also depicted the world as made up of racial heroes and villains, the latter
considered to be untermenschen (subhumans). 52 Millions of innocent civilians, including
Jews, Gypsies, and homosexuals, were systematically murdered by the Nazis. 53 Prisoners
of war and civilian populations were tortured and murdered at will. Innocent civilians
were subjected to the Nazis' infamous medical experiments conducted specifically to
inflict the utmost pain and suffering. 54 Entire populations were deported to provide slave
labor under the most horrible conditions for German industry. 55 The list of war crimes
and crimes against humanity is virtually endless. Undoubtedly, the majority of these
crimes arose from the Nazi conception of "total war," according to which everything,
from rules and regulations to assurances and treaties, became subordinate to the dictates
51
Ed., The New Republic, 28 February 1994, 1.
52
Taylor, The Anatomy ofthe Nuremberg Trials, 21
.
53 Robert E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, (New York: Carroll and Graf, 1984), 37-38.
54 Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, 286-296.
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of a racial war of conquest. 56 Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the High Command of the Armed
Forces, proclaimed that, "This is... [a] matter of life and death. This struggle has nothing
to do.
.
.with soldierly chivalry or the regulations of the Geneva Convention."57
By late 1 942, the Allies could not help but become aware of these systematic acts
of cruelty and barbarism and understand that they would be confronted with numerous
options on how to confront these atrocities when hostilities came to a close. They could
conclude the war with a handshake, as the great powers of the nineteenth century often
did, thereby re-establishing a balance of power in Europe by exacting no penalty from
Germany. 58 Or they could rely on the Germans to prosecute those accused of war crimes,
although the experience with this following World War I proved disappointing. 59 Finally,
the Allies could summarily execute, without benefit of trial, the Nazi leadership and
organizations that had perpetrated the greatest atrocities.
The victors instead chose to place Nazi leaders on trial before the world and to
allow German wartime policies and conduct to be tried by an international tribunal. 60 As
a result, on October 20, 1943, the United Nations War Crime Commission (UNWCC)
55
Taylor, The Anatomy ofthe Nuremberg Trials, 427-431.
56
"From Nuremberg to Bosnia: Consistent Application of International Law," Cleveland State Law Review,
Volume 42:705 (1994): 708.
57 Matthew Lippman, "War Crimes: American Prosecutors of Nazi Military Officers," Touro International
Law Review, Volume 6:1 (1995): 280.
58 For a concise history of international relationships in the modern era, see Gordon A. Craig and
Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft, 3rd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
9 The results of war crime trials after World War I made this option the most unlikely. Following World
War 1, the Allies' plan to prosecute German war criminals by an international tribunal was abandoned in
the interests of preserving the stability of the politically precarious Weimar Republic. Germany agreed to
conduct a limited number of trials before the Penal Senate of the Reichsgericht. However, they showed
little enthusiasm for prosecuting their own combatants. Of the 896 Germans accused of war crimes by the
victors, only 12 were indicted. Three defendants never appeared and three were acquitted, while the
remainder received trivial sentences. See James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and
Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publication
Group, 1982).
60 Chaney, "Pitfalls and Imperatives," 62.
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was established in London. Its purpose was to formulate principles of international law
and plan for the creation of a postwar international tribunal. Its primary task was to
collect, investigate, and record evidence of war crimes and report all instances in which a
prime facie case existed. 61 As it turned out, political considerations, namely the U.S.
refusal to relinquish control over the proceedings, reduced the UNWCC to a collector of
information, rather than an investigative body.
To strengthen further resolve and show unity amongst the Allies, on October 30,
1943, President Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet
Premier Joseph Stalin signed the Moscow Declaration. 62 This declaration stated that,
upon cessation of conflict, the Allies would prosecute the Nazi war criminals for their
aggression and wartime conduct. The Moscow Declaration, however, failed to set forth
any procedures or guiding principles for the prosecution of these criminals. Specifically,
there was no one common design for their judgment and punishment. Consequently, the
decisions by the Allies to convene an international tribunal evolved before finally
resulting in the IMT. This dilemma prompted several proposed solutions. Stalin, half-
jokingly, suggested the liquidation of 50,000 Nazis. 63 Frustrated after World War I in
their effort to have the Kaiser tried for war crimes, the British, leery of another proposal
for an international tribunal, advocated the summary execution of the major war criminals
61 Tutorow, War Crimes, War Criminals and War Crime Trials, 4.
62 See Harold Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (Birmingham,
Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1963) and Richard A. Falk, Gabriel Kolko and Robert J. Lifton,
eds., Crimes of War: A Legal, Political-Documentary, and Psychological Inquiry into the Responsibility of
Leaders, Citizens, and Soldiersfor Criminal Acts in Wars (New York: Random House, 1971), 73-75.
,3
Stalin had allegedly compiled a list of 50,000 Nazi war criminals. Following a banquet attended by
Roosevelt and Churchill at the Tehran Conference, he proposed a toast, stating, "I drink to the quickest
possible justice for all German war criminals. I drink to the justice of a firing squad." When Churchill
objected, Stalin again raised his glass and proclaimed, "Fifty thousand must be shot." See Taylor, The
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with judicial proceedings for lesser ones. 64
The United States initially proposed the Morgenthau Plan, a draconian measure
which envisioned the destruction of German industry. Supporters of the Morgenthau plan
intended to penalize the civilian population for their collective guilt, along with the
whole-sale arrest of members of such groups as the Schutz Staffel (S.S.) and the Sturm
Abteilung (S.A.), as well as the summary execution of the major war criminals.
Ultimately, the Allies settled upon a course of action proposed by the United States
Secretary of War, Henry Stimson. Under Stimson's plan, all alleged Nazi war criminals
would be brought to trial before an international tribunal.65
The plan had several objectives. First, judicial proceedings might avert future
hostilities which were likely to result from the execution, absent a trial, of alleged
offenders. The United States argued that an execution-style judgment would be a crass
political act that could quite possibly transform the Nazis into martyrs and thereby
provide a platform for those intent on revitalizing national socialism. 66 Second, legal
proceedings would bring German policies and conduct to the attention of all the world.
Third, the trial, with worldwide dissemination, would legitimize Allied conduct during
and after the war. Fourth, a trial, it was hoped, would advance and legitimize
international law. An international trial "would provide an historical record, would help
develop international standards of legal conduct, and would serve as a deterrent to future
leaders contemplating similar actions."67 Finally, and most important, judicial
Anatomy ofthe Nuremberg Trials, 30.
64
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67
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proceedings would permit the Allied powers, and the world, to punish the Nazi leadership
rather than Germany's civilian population. 68
By the summer of 1945, with the Allied powers' disagreements over punishment
reconciled, representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great
Britain met in London to formulate the principles under which a trial of the major Nazi
war criminals would be conducted. On August 8, ignoring the legitimacy that would have
been gained by submitting the proposal for ratification as an international treaty, the four
victors signed the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis Powers.69 More commonly referred to as the "London
Agreement," it consisted of two parts: the agreement itself and the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal. 70 Drawn principally from the Hague and Geneva
Conventions and the laudable, but unrealistic, Kellogg-Brian Pact71
,
the agreement
advocated establishing an international military tribunal for the trial of war criminals
whose offenses had no specific geographical location or strict timeframe, while the
Charter, which was annexed to the agreement, set out the constitution, jurisdiction, and
functions of the envisioned tribunal. 72
The Allies, again refusing to make the tribunal truly international, insisted that the
membership to IMT be limited to themselves and be comprised of four members and four
68 Chaney, "Pitfalls and Imperatives," 62.
69 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
August 8, 1945, 59 Statue 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
70 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, 59 Statue 1546, 82 U.N.T.S.; Trial of the
Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 1 (Washington DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1947-49), 8-16.
71 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm.
72 Mark A. Bland, "An Analysis of the United Nations International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes
Committed in the Former Yugoslavia: Parallels, Problems and Prospects," Indiana University School of
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alternate members (one each from each nation). Decisions were made by majority vote,
conviction requiring at least three affirmative votes, and the Tribunal was to be in session
for one year. Article VI of the IMT Charter specified three categories of crimes for which
the accused Nazis would be tried: 73
• Crimes Against Peace (Article Via) - planning, initiating, and waging
wars of aggression, or in violation of international treaties, agreements, or
assurances or the participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
• War Crimes (Article VIb) - namely, violations of the laws or customs
of war. Violations shall include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-
treatment, or deportation to slave labor, or for any other purpose of civilian
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners
of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or
private property, and wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages not
justified by military necessity; 74
• Crimes Against Humanity (Article Vic) - namely, murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether
or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
In addition to enumerating the categories of crimes for which the accused Nazi
leaders would be tried, the Allies specified in the Charter that the principal leaders of a
state were not exempt from prosecution; that "Befehl ist Befehl," (orders are orders) or
obedience to superior orders, would not be a viable excuse, though in extenuating
Law Doctoral Thesis, 1995, 2.
73 http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-nurem.htm.
74
This count was more clearly rooted in precedent than the other two. International laws of war had
developed during the 18th and 19th centuries. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 dealt with the
conduct of war by outlawing certain types of weapons (dum-dum bullets, poison gas) and outlining the
proper treatment of POWs/civilians. The Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906 dealt with treatment of the
sick and wounded (after 1929, the treatment of POWs was promulgated by the Geneva Convention.).
Naval law developed separately and originally dealt with problems of piracy, rescue, false flags, and the
like.
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circumstances it might mitigate a sentence; that accomplices were responsible for all acts
performed by any person in the course of a common plan or conspiracy to commit a
specific crime; and that the IMT had the authority to declare that a group or organization
to which an accused belonged was a criminal organization. 75 Further, the IMT was
required to state the basis for its findings of guilt and innocence, and was accorded the
right to impose any punishment it deemed just, including execution. The seat of the IMT
was established at Berlin, but Nuremberg was chosen as the place of trial for practical
reasons (because of the availability of the bomb-damaged German Palace of Justice and
its adjoining prison) as well as symbolic reasons (it was at Nuremberg that the Nazis
staged annual mass demonstrations and decreed the anti-Semitic "Nuremberg Laws" in
1935). 76 The first day of trial was November 20, 1945.
The list of the accused was to some extent arbitrary, as the defendants represented
the major branches of the Third Reich and included prisoners held by each of the four
prosecuting nations. 77 Attention, driven by political rather than legal motives, was
generally paid to how well known each was and how much power they had wielded rather
than the availability of evidence against them. The trial of the twenty-two major war
criminals was carried out over 284 days, and on October 1, 1946 the verdicts were
75 Lippman, "Nuremberg: Forty-Five Years Later," 26.
76
Taylor, The Anatomy ofthe Nuremberg Trials, 64.
n The twenty-two major defendants were Karl Doenitz, Supreme Commander of the Navy; Hans Frank,
Governor-General of Poland; Wilhelm Frick, Minister of the Interior; Hans Fritzsche, Ministerial Director;
Walther Funk, Reichsbank President; Hermann Goering, Reichsmarschall; Rudolf Hess, Deputy to Hitler;
Alfred Jodl, Chief of Army Ops; Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of Reich Main Security Office; Wilhelm
Keitel, High Command COS; Erich Raeder, Grand Admiral of the Navy; Alfred Rosenberg, Minister of the
Occupied Eastern Territories; Fritz Sauckel, Labor leader; Hjalmar Schacht, Minister of Economics; Arthur
Seyss-Inquart, Commissar of the Netherlands; Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments and War Production;
Julius Streicher, Editor of Der Stiirmer and Director of the Central Committee for the Defense against
Jewish Atrocity and Boycott Propaganda; Constantin von Neurath, Protector of Bohemia and Moravia,
Franz von Papen; former Chancellor; Joachim von Ribbentrop, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Baldur von
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delivered. Three men were acquitted, four received prison terms not exceeding twenty
years, two were sentenced to life in prison, and thirteen were sentenced to death. Four
Nazi organizations were declared criminal. 78 Many lesser war criminals were tried over
the next three years by military tribunals within the respective zones of occupation.
Additionally, many non-German collaborators were tried for treason by their own
governments. 79
Though often criticized as a show trial that disregarded positive and natural law,
the IMT at Nuremberg in 1945-46 was nonetheless a milestone event in the development
of international law. 80 The trials were the first successful international attempt to indict
and convict the perpetrators of crimes cruel and inhuman to a degree not previously
known to humanity. 81 Nuremberg, especially in its condemnation of aggressive war,
focused not only on the offenses of these defendants but also on establishing a precedent
Schirach, Reich Youth leader.
78 Die Schutz Staffel (S.S.), Der Sicherheitsdienst (S.D.), Die Geheimstaatspolizei (Gestapo), and the
Leadership Corp of the Nazi Party.
79 Chaney, "Pitfalls and Imperatives," 65.
80
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designed to punish and deter aggression in the future. 82 The charter and subsequent
judgment left an indelible mark on the law of war, especially with respect to the notion of
individual responsibility for the violation of accepted international law. It infused
positive law with the fundamental moral principles of natural law and thereby contributed
to the modern international law of human rights. The reality of international life today,
however, seems to make a mockery of these principles, as events in the former
Yugoslavia seemed to have defied the IMT judgment and the Nuremberg principles. 83
B. THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA
The complicated intermingling of the various ethno-religious communities in the
former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the primary reason that the
Balkans are arguably Europe's most unstable region. "However, ethnic atrocities, widely
believed to be atavistic, are not just the result of ancient hatreds, but also of forces and
events from more recent times. To impute the current maliciousness to antiquity alone is
to mythologize it and thereby diminish its barbarity."84 The destructive forces that
allowed ethnic cleansing and war crimes to occur in the former Yugoslavia can be
attributed to a more recent phenomenon. 85
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Tito, the storied hero of the anti-Nazi resistance who held Yugoslavia in balance
for nearly two generations, died in 1980. The "collective presidency" that he designed to
hold all regions and ethnic groups together after his death fell apart in 1989; and after
that, the demagogues exploited the situation to their own ends. 86 The driving force that
did greater harm than all others in destroying this balance of communities was Serbian
leader Slobodan Milosevic, who advocated a "Greater Serbia," which he pursued by
taking more power for himself and more territory for Serbia. Milosevic was directly
responsible for the propaganda that transformed many Serbs into killers. 87
The Yugoslav destruction erupted in the summer of 1991, when Croatia and
Slovenia declared independence without offering concrete guarantees for the security of
the 500,000 Serbs within their borders. The declaration led to a sporadic civil war in
Croatia between the majority Croats and the Serbs, who, despite being the minority, had
the backing of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA). 88 Lacking the
experience and armaments of the Serbs, the Croatian forces suffered heavy casualties
while losing nearly one-third of their territory. In January 1992, after six months of
intense fighting, Croatia and Serbia agreed to the deployment of a peacekeeping force
known as the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the area of the conflict
inside Croatia. Despite this Croatian defeat and the overwhelming advantages held by the
Serbs, the drive for independence in Eastern Europe, together with the political disputes
between the federal Yugoslav government and the governments of Croatia and Slovenia,
86 Roger Cohen, "Why is the Conflict so Virulent?" Macmillan Atlas of War and Peace: Bosnia-
Herzegovina (1996): 10.
87 Anthony Lewis, "War Crimes," The New Republic, 20 March 1995, 3 1
.
88 The JNA, at the time, was the third largest standing army in all of Europe. See Nier III, "The
Yugoslavian Civil War," 303, 310.
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encouraged the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its separatist aspirations. The
Yugoslav Federal Army, fearful of losing additional territory to breakaway republics,
especially the crucial air base facilities and arms production centers in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, increased its support to the Bosnian Serbs, who began to take a hard-line
approach in their negotiations with secession-minded groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Nonetheless, on October 15, 1991, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed its
sovereignty and initiated the process to secede from what remained of Yugoslavia. 89
Pressure on the Bosnian government immediately began to mount from all sides.
The European Community required that the Bosnians hold an independence referendum
before it would recognize Bosnia as a sovereign state. The Bosnian Serbs, knowing they
had the support of the Yugoslav Federal Army, were ready to resort to violence to prevent
the succession. Serbia, for its part, instituted an economic blockade of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in an effort to coerce the region to remain in the now Serb-dominated
Yugoslavia. Undeterred, the Bosnian government proceeded with the independence
referendum on March 1, 1992.90 Predictably, Pan-Serbian nationalists loyal to Serbian
Democratic Party leader Radovan Karadzic boycotted the referendum, and former
Yugoslav National Army units that had organized themselves into a Bosnian Serb armed
militia declared their support for Karadzic. The near consensus of voters in favor of
independence was, therefore, not representative of Bosnia at large. Nonetheless, the
sovereign state of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed its independence on
89 Zoran Paji, "The Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Violation of Fundamental Rights in the Former





March 6, 1992. Bosnia-Herzegovina was formally recognized as a sovereign state by the
European Community on April 6, and by the United States one day later. As a direct
result of these acts of political recognition, Serbian attacks against the fledging republic
intensified, and on April 7 the Serbs announced the creation of the "Serbian Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina," a separatist entity within the newly-formed Bosnian state.
Assisted by 45,000 JNA troops, the Bosnian Serb militias, under the leadership of their
self-styled president Radovan Karadzic, forced hundreds of thousands of non-Serb
civilians from their homes and committed tens of thousands of acts of murder, rape and
torture as part of a systematic policy of "ethnic cleansing." Serbian policy was aimed at
creating an ethnically "pure" Serbian state, comprising two-thirds of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which would then be united with Serbia and Montenegro and with the
recently carved out ethnically-cleansed region in Croatia to form a "Greater Serbia." This
prompted the first outside response to the Serbian abuse of human rights, with the U.S.
State Department condemning the Serbs for ethnic cleansing.91
By mid- 1992, following the shelling of the major Muslim population centers of
Sarajevo, Mostar, Bihac, Tusla, and Goradze by JNA and Serb insurgent forces, the
situation in Bosnia had deteriorated to such a degree that, on July 29, the Ambassador and
Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muhamed Sacirbey, sent a letter
to the Security Council requesting intervention. 92 Shortly thereafter the Security Council
passed the United States-sponsored Resolution 771, which called upon states and
international humanitarian organizations to make available to the Council any
91 See Marc Weller, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia," American Journal ofInternational Law, (July 1992).
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substantiated information in their possession relating to the commission of human rights
violations in the former Yugoslavia. 93 In the end, aside from some of the parties involved
in the conflict, only the United States submitted a report.
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights decided to appoint a Special
Rapporteur, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the former Prime Minister of Poland, to investigate
violations of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia (particularly in Bosnia-
Herzegovina) and to provide a preliminary report to the Secretary-General by late August
1992. 94 His report reached the obvious conclusion that most of former Yugoslavia,
especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, was the "scene of massive and systematic violations of
human rights, as well as serious grave violations of humanitarian law," and that
harassment, discrimination, torture, and violence against the Muslim population were
commonplace.95
The Security Council acted again in early October 1992, adopting Resolution 780.
It requested that the Secretary-General "establish, as a matter of urgency, an impartial
Commission of Experts to examine and analyze the information submitted pursuant to
Resolution 771...together with additional information obtained through their own
investigations."96 The five-member Kalshoven Commission of Experts was to provide
the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the human rights situation in the former
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Yugoslavia. 97 Based on the findings of the Kalshoven Commission, the U.N. demanded,
to no avail, that the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia refrain from violating
international humanitarian law and the established customs and laws of war. As a result,
the Security Council, on February 22, 1993, resolved to create an international tribunal to
prosecute the offenders. Additionally, it requested that the Secretary-General formulate a
proposal to carry out this resolution.
98 Some three months later, on May 25, 1993, after
having approved the Secretary-General's report, the Security Council adopted the Statute
of the International Tribunal. Unanimously approved as Security Council Resolution
827, the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was established "for the sole
purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia."99 Acting under and finding its legal
basis in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 100 its purpose is to prosecute
those individuals responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the former Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991. Specifically, the Hague
Tribunal was created to serve five important goals: deter future violations of international
criminal law; break the endless cycle of ethnic violence and retribution, thereby paving
the way for reconciliation; establish a historical record of atrocities before the guilty
97
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could reinvent the truth; bring the guilty to justice in a fair manner; and serve as a model
for future ad hoc tribunals or a permanent international criminal court. 101
Unlike the IMT at Nuremberg, the Hague Tribunal's jurisdiction, as outlined in
the Statute of the International Tribunal, encompasses not aggressive war, but serious
violations of international humanitarian law. Article 1 established that the Tribunal "shall
have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991."
Specifically, under Articles 2 through 5 of the statute, the Tribunal's jurisdiction
encompasses: 102
• Grave Breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention (Article 2)— which
includes the willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment, causing great
suffering or serious injury to people protected by the conventions, and the
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly. Grave
breaches further include compelling prisoners of war or civilians to serve
in the forces of a hostile power, willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a
civilian of the rights to a fair and regular trial, the unlawful deportation or
transfer or unlawful confinement of civilians, and the taking of civilian
hostages;
• Violations of the laws or customs of war (Article 3) — includes the
employment of weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; the
wanton destruction of population centers not justified by military
necessity; the attack of undefended population centers; the seizure of,
destruction or willful damage done to institutions of religion, charity,
education, and the arts and science; historic monuments and works of art
and science; and the plunder of public or private property. Hague law
regulates the means and methods of warfighting in a manner that seeks to
minimize unnecessary injury or suffering;
• Genocide (Article 4)— as derived from the 1 948 Convention, genocide
international peace and security.
101 Michael P. Scharf, "The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court," Duke Journal of
Comparative and International Law (fall 1995): 168.
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is defined by the United Nations as an intentional attempt to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group by killing
members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group, deliberately inflicting on its members conditions of life
calculated to bring about the group's physical destruction in whole or in
part, imposing measures to prevent births within the group, or forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group. Punishable crimes of
genocide also include conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public
incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide, and
complicity in genocide;
• Crimes against humanity (Article 5) — includes acts committed
against any civilian population in times of international or internal armed
conflict: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment,
torture, rape, persecution on political, racial and religious grounds, and
other inhumane acts.
"Bosnia is not Auschwitz, and the Serbian leaders are not Hitler. The scale of war
crimes in the former Yugoslavia is much smaller. But the principles are the same. A
people were singled out for destruction because they were different." 103 Just as
Nuremberg was used by the Allies to punish those individuals responsible for genocide
and launching an aggressive war and to absolve the German people of guilt, the
credibility of international humanitarian law dictates that a tribunal is essential to hold
accountable those who practiced ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. However,
though on the surface there seem to be similarities between the two tribunals, those who
expect the blanket of mass indictments and arguably foredrawn convictions of
Nuremberg to be repeated at The Hague need to temper their expectations, as there are
significant differences in the complex web of moral, political, and legal issues.
Though there are differences between the two tribunals, the precedents established
by the IMT with the Nuremberg Principles have nonetheless been invaluable in
Lewis, "War Crimes," 29.
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establishing the legitimacy of the Hague Tribunal.
35
36
III. THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
It is therefore fitting that we should again proclaim our determination that
none who participate in these acts of savagery go unpunished.
Franklin D. Roosevelt (1944) 104
The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated,
so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being
ignored, because it cannot survive their being repeated.
Robert H.Jackson (1945) 105
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NUREMBERG
Though even its most vociferous supporters readily admitted that the International
Military Tribunal had a shaky legal foundation, it nonetheless was the first, and up until
the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the only international criminal
tribunal in modern times. "Its charter and subsequent judgment are among the most
significant developments in recent international law, but like any other novel endeavor,
the Nuremberg IMT has engendered its share of criticism." 106
Telford Taylor suggests that the trials were deeply flawed, but Justice Jackson
stated that the Allied prosecutors were "consoled by the fact that in proceedings of this
novelty, errors and mistakes may also be instructive in the future." 107 Despite the
criticism that the demerits (victor's justice, ex postfacto application of Allied-formulated
laws, violation of the defendants' due process and rights of appeal, and the tenuous legal
foundation of the Tribunal's existence and authority) raise questions as to the legal
104
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validity and credibility of the process, the trial and subsequent minor trials definitively
established that individuals rather than states are responsible for violations of
international law. The Allies applied to such lawbreakers the principle of conspiracy, by
which those who join in a common plan to commit war crimes are responsible for the acts
of any other conspirator in executing the plan. In dismissing the plea of "acts of state" as
freeing defendants from legal responsibility, the charter refused to recognize the
immunity once enjoyed by criminal statesmanship. Nuremberg made clear that even the
highest state official would be liable for the systematic commission of gross violations of
human rights. 108 This return to fundamental principles of international law was a
complete rejection of "the extreme positivist assertion that the state, supreme within its
own sphere, sovereign and equal to other states in international law, shields its officials
from international sanction by virtue of state privileges and immunities." 109 Moreover,
the Charter ruled that the orders of a superior do not free a defendant from responsibility.
Finally, the legacy of Nuremberg did not place the responsibility solely on the shoulders
of the aggressor. As Chief Justice Jackson stated, "it was quite evident that the law of the
Charter pierced national sovereignty and presupposed that all statesmen had a
responsibility for international peace and order, as well as responsibilities to their own
states."
110 The international community could no longer ignore atrocities committed in
war and claim the status of an innocent bystander. To do so would be incriminating and
make the international community at least partially responsible.
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B. PRINCIPLES OF THE NUREMBERG INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL
Though the IMT never remotely claimed to have outlawed the concept of war, the
trial and conviction of the major Nazi leaders were nonetheless innovative and led to an
eventual general acceptance by the international community of the human rights concept
embodied in what would eventually become known as the "Nuremberg Principles."
These principles, in conjunction with the post-Nuremberg codification of war crimes law,
have provided some of the most important precedents, and therefore legitimacy, for the
United Nation Security Council Resolutions that established the Hague Tribunal. 111
The first Nuremberg Principle states that any person(s) who commits an act that
constitutes a crime under international law is personally responsible for the act and is
therefore liable to punishment. 112 The fundamental rule is that "international law may
impose duties on individuals directly without interposition of internal law." 113
The second Nuremberg Principle declared that "the fact that internal law does not
impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not
relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law." 114
An individual who has committed an international crime that is punishable under
international law is liable for his act, regardless of the provisions of internal law. This
principle is credited with having established the "supremacy" of international law over
Printing Office, 1945), ix.
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national law.
The IMT also established the accountability of individuals for crimes committed
by them acting as heads of state or as responsible government officials. Under Principle
III, the fact that a person acted in this capacity while committing a gross violation of
human rights does not relieve him of international responsibility. The Tribunal explicitly
rejected the concept that because wars are fought by states, they alone must answer for
their consequences, and instead held that leaders who plan and wage aggressive wars or
direct others to commit crimes must answer personally for their actions. 115
Principle IV stated that "the fact that a person acted pursuant to an order of his
Government or of a superior does not free him from responsibility under international
law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible." The existence of a superior's orders
is not a defense.
Principle V addressed the issue of fairness and impartiality during a trial
conducted for gross violations of international humanitarian law. Individuals charged
with war crimes should not be dealt with summarily, but rather should have a fair trial,
during which they are presumed innocent until evidence establishes guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. This principle lessens the likelihood that petty revenge will supplant
justice, or in the case of the war criminals in Germany and the former Yugoslavia, turn
them into martyrs and thereby provide a grounds for reviving the very acts the
international community hoped to stop.
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Principle VI set forth that the following are punishable under international law: 116
• Crimes Against Peace:
— Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances;
— Participation in a common plan or conspiracy or the
accomplishment of any of the aforementioned.
Though not incorporated into the Hague Tribunal, this category of crime would
have been applicable to Serbian and Croatian leaders who started the war and to the
Bosnian Serb military commanders or political leaders who prolonged the conflict;
• War Crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of war which include,
but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-labor or
for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas, killing
of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of
cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
This would undoubtedly be applicable to the atrocities committed in detention
camps throughout the former Yugoslavia and to the general human rights violations and
destruction of cities and religious shrines not justified by military necessity.
• Crimes Against Humanity: Murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population,
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are
done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection
with any crime against peace or any war crime.
This has direct applicability to the former Yugoslavia where ethnic cleansing and
mass rape in Bosnia reached epidemic proportions. Proof of systematic governmental
planning of the atrocities is required; however, the character and evident systematic





Finally, Principle VII stated that complicity in the commission of a crime against
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principles VI is a crime
under international law.
C. THE IMPACT OF THE NUREMBERG IMT TODAY
The Nuremberg Principles have had a profound impact on international criminal
jurisprudence. Not only have the principles established by Nuremberg been incorporated
into many domestic legal systems, 117 they have also influenced the Charter of the United
Nations and the meaning and legal status of many of the norms found in the 1948
Genocide Convention, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocols I
and II, and the 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture. The norms apparent in
these and other multilateral human rights treaties adopted since Nuremberg are evidence
that the majority of nations, including the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY), 118 recognize the significance of the Nuremberg Principles in
contemporary international law. 119
The consensus today is that the Nuremberg Principles, while not setting a formal
precedent 120 in international law, are nonetheless an integral component and that
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individual responsibility for war crimes has become widely accepted as an international
legal norm, despite the lack of a permanent judicial body to enforce it. 121 The Nuremberg
Principles, in conjunction with international positive law codifications and Security
Council Resolutions addressing the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, provide a sufficient
legal basis to indict, arrest, and prosecute individuals in the former Yugoslavia who have
committed or sanctioned barbaric acts in direct violation of international human rights
law and the laws and customs of war.
Though the Hague Tribunal relies much more heavily on a legal foundation, it has
been dogged by obstacles that were absent at Nuremberg. For example, the codification
of international laws since Nuremberg is, ironically, making it considerably more difficult
to convict those war criminals currently being held at The Hague. Because of The
Hague's required adherence and respect for the norms of customary international law, the
criteria for determination of culpability and the subsequent finding of guilt for the
accused are much more rigid than those applied at Nuremberg. In addition, physical
evidence and eyewitness testimony are scarce; the ability to apprehend violators is
doubtful, as the mandate of IFOR (Implementation Force)/SFOR (Stabilization Force)
makes soldiers reluctant to seize suspects or guard war crime sites; and the Tribunal's
effectiveness is undermined by the lack of funding, resources, and world interest.
Regardless, The Hague represents an excellent opportunity, and the first since
Nuremberg, to vindicate international humanitarian law by prosecuting those responsible
for committing war crimes. Its moral and legal grounds, backed by principles established
jurisdiction over individuals has been created since Nuremberg. Thus, the judgment of the IMT cannot
constitute a truly binding and authoritative precedent in international law.
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at Nuremberg, enables the Hague Tribunal to reaffirm the sanctity of basic human rights.
Though the Nuremberg proceedings have rightly been acclaimed as a significant
and defining moment in terms of the development and enforcement of international and
humanitarian law, they cannot be easily used as a blanket precedent for the Hague
Tribunal. Admittedly, Nuremberg's strengths, as discussed above, provide for the
legitimate prosecution of war criminals in Yugoslavia under universally accepted
international laws and conventions. However, it is more important to recognize the
deficiencies of IMT and thus its limits as a precedent for The Hague.
It is crucial that the IMT's weaknesses, as largely a politically driven process that
was questionably supported by an internationally recognized framework of applicable
law, are recognized by those who insist upon making the dangerous assumption that the
same principles that convicted the war criminals of Nazi Germany be used to convict
those in the former Yugoslavia. If simple comparisons are drawn between the two
tribunals, dangerous expectations of applying the same criteria for guilt at the Hague
Tribunal as at Nuremberg may lead not only to disappointment in the West with the
perceived ineffectiveness of the tribunal, but more importantly to a situation where the
aggrieved parties in the former Yugoslavia become dubious of seeing justice done
through the tribunal — leading to a renewal of conflict outside the courtroom. As this
leads to a general breakdown of the Dayton Accords, not only are the ramifications for
the United States, the key power in bringing stability to this region potentially enormous,
but also the Euro-Atlantic system of states and due process of law.
121 Sunga, "Individual Responsibility in International Law," 35.
44
IV. WHY THE HAGUE CANNOT BE ANOTHER NUREMBERG
That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay
the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the
judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has
ever paid to reason.
122
Robert H.Jackson (1945)
We have an obligation to carry forward the lessons of Nuremberg. Those
accused of war crimes against humanity and genocide must be brought to
justice. There must be peace for justice to prevail, but there must be
justice when peace prevails.
William J. Clinton (1994)
In early 1993, then United States Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger
proclaimed that "a second Nuremberg was in store for the practitioners of ethnic
cleansing," naming ten candidates, including Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, for
prosecution as war criminals. 123 In 1993 as well, then United States Ambassador to the
United Nations Madeleine Albright, referring to Nuremberg, stated in an address to the
General Assembly on the establishment of a possible tribunal to hear war crimes in the
former Yugoslavia that "there is an echo in this chamber today." 124 Unfortunately,
Eagleburger and Albright fell prey to the euphoria that enveloped the international
community with the passage of U.N. Security Council resolutions establishing the Hague
Tribunal. Like many others, they believed that the legal, political, and moral principles
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that were applied to Nazi leaders and organizations for indictment and judgment could be
successfully applied to the accused war criminals from the former Yugoslavia.
Comparisons between the Hague and Nuremberg tribunals became inevitable. However,
proponents of the idea that the Hague Tribunal would be a second Nuremberg had to
consider salient dissimilarities. Two significant differences — the basis of creation and
the framework of applicable law— require examination.
A. BASIS OF ESTABLISHMENT
An important precept to determine the legitimacy of an international war crimes
trial is whether the tribunal itself is based on globally accepted legal precedents and
principles. 125 Although international legitimacy is not the case when individual states
conduct war crime trials according to their own domestic laws (as was the case with
Adolf Eichmann in Israel or, more recently, the trial of Maurice Papon in France),
legitimacy becomes crucial when the proceedings are conducted on an international stage,
since the legitimacy of the tribunal's creation and of the subsequent trials will only be
affirmed in the world's eyes if they are grounded in the basic principles of international
law. 126 In this respect, the IMT fell short because it failed to subscribe to legal principles
acceptable to a majority of states; Nuremberg's basis was determined by the political
objectives of the victors. Since it had a limited basis in the then-acceptable framework of
international law and given that one of the central objectives at Nuremberg was to create
new principles of international law, it is not surprising that the establishment of the IMT,
Such Body Since Nuremberg," The Washington Post, 23 February 1993, Al.
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as Telford Taylor himself readily admits, was the result of a political, and not legal,
127
process.
Fifty years of reflection by the international community has given the Hague
Tribunal an opportunity to avoid these very charges. Though criticism is inevitable
whenever states confront one another in the international arena, the framers of the Hague
Tribunal have implemented measures to ensure that the current tribunal is grounded in
legal principles that are widely-accepted legal by the international community.
1. Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
From the initial pleas by the exiled leaders of German-occupied states at the 1942
London Declaration of St. James to the signing of the London Agreement in 1945, the
establishment and operation of the IMT had a problematic basis in recognized
international positive law. Once the decision to prosecute Nazi war criminals was made
by the Allies in 1 942, the process of establishing a tribunal was dominated by the United
States, the USSR, France and Great Britain; all other states were excluded. Though
Allied politicians claimed that the establishment of a tribunal would be an unanimously
agreed upon and collaborative effort, it was in all respects a unilateral process controlled
by the United States and driven by political, rather than legal, imperatives.
Within the United States political establishment there were two competing and
contradictory initiatives. The Treasury Department backed the Morgenthau Plan, which
claimed that all Germans were criminally responsible and the demanded total de-
Nazification, demilitarization, and deindustrialization of Germany. In contrast, the War
Taylor, The Anatomy ofthe Nuremberg Trials, 50-51.
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Department backed Stimson Plan, which argued that the atrocities committed by the
Third Reich could only be corrected by the reaffirmation of principles of international
legality, and that this required the establishment of an international body (restricted to
only the victors) to sit in judgment. 128
Once the political choice had been made by the Allies to establish a tribunal based
on the proposals of the Stimson initiative, major disagreements along the way were
nonetheless still not resolved by legal precedence, but rather by political fiat. For
example, despite the Soviet opinion that the formation of a tribunal should be based on
the drafting of an internationally agreed upon treaty— such treaties historically being
the source of positive international law and the only means, therefore, of securing binding
force for these decisions— public opinion and political pressure, especially in the United
States, forced an entirely novel alternative procedure by means of which the tribunal
would be established. 129 The Allies, without even attempting to gain international
legitimacy by soliciting outside consultation or ratification, signed the London
Agreement, which established the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to try
Nazi war criminals, and the Nuremberg Charter, which defined the Tribunal's
jurisdiction, composition, powers and procedures.
Ratification of a treaty establishing the IMT by a majority of the international
community would have ensured that Nuremberg was firmly grounded in the principles of
customary international law. Instead, the Allies established a Tribunal that had a
questionable legal basis, which tainted its legitimacy.
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Essentially the product of a lengthy and complex political process dominated by
the United States and restricted to Russian, British, and French approval, the legal basis
of the IMT at Nuremberg has been susceptible to challenge and controversy.' 30 In
hindsight it must therefore be viewed as highly regrettable that the Allies did not establish
the IMT in a manner that, at the very least, showed any respect for the norms of
customary international law. The refusal even to consider a basic precept of universal
acceptability by formulating a multilateral treaty, though admittedly a time-consuming
process, in establishing what was after all being described as an "international" tribunal
served to strengthen the hands of those castigating the proceedings as nothing more than
political or show trials. 131
Further charges of political maneuvering resulted from the composition of the
body sitting in judgment. The IMT, composed ofjudges from only the "Big Four" Allied
Powers, was not, as its name suggests, an international court, and as a result raised
questions about the defendants' ability to be impartially judged. Further evidence that the
defendants were judged as political criminals was the fact that two of the judges of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, Major General I.T. Nikitchenko (Soviet Union) and Robert Falko
(alternate, France), had served earlier as members of the committee that drafted the
Nuremberg Charter and subsequent indictments. Having written the law to be applied
and selected the defendants to be tried, they were not likely to be sufficiently impartial
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and unbiased judges. 132 The Charter also included various novel international legal
doctrines that were applied exclusively to the acts of the vanquished, specifically the
Nazis. All the defendants were German; no defendants from the other European Axis
Powers were indicted or tried before the IMT. Furthermore, no Allied personnel were
prosecuted. Had judges and prosecutors been drawn from neutral countries, acting
without political constraints, charges against the Allies may have been lodged for such
acts as deportation and internment of the Japanese, the fire-bombing of Dresden, the
massacres of Poles at Katyn, or the failure to assist Jewish refugees. 133
Beyond the actual establishment of the Tribunal, its judgments also were largely
devoid of any detailed legal analysis, as the IMT devoted little attention to the guilt of
individual defendants. 134 In most instances it is hard to argue today that guilt was not
predetermined. During the drafting conference, Justice Jackson recognized that, "There
could be but one decision in this case... that we are bound to concede [guilt]." 135 In
several other instances, the determination of guilt and punishment were the product of
the lobbying and biases of the governments sitting in judgment. 136
Finally, an argument can be made that Nuremberg was a politically driven process
when related to goals of the Western Powers concerning post-World War II security
interests — specifically to help smooth America's transition to superpower status. 137
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Though the Soviets sat at the same prosecutory table as the Western Allies, ideological
differences between the two sides may have already started to shape the new Cold War
security environment. As a result, it can be argued that in order to recruit Germany into a
post-World War II alliance, Western members of the Tribunal, led by the United States,
avoided actively entertaining arguments that would intentionally incite international
condemnation of the entire German populace as being collectively responsible for the
atrocities committed by the Nazis. Some revisionist historians agree with Bradley Smith
that in an attempt to help Germany rebuild politically and economically, Western
governments exerted political pressure to force their respective Tribunal members to
interpret the aggressive war count narrowly and thus to limit the proceedings to a
consideration of the liability of only the most senior officials in the Third Reich. In the
view of the Tribunal, the average German citizen, including the common soldier, was
repressed and intimidated into cooperation with the Nazi regime and therefore did not
deserve prosecution. This argument is highlighted by the West's failure to bring many
German industrialists to trial; only Funk, Speer, and Schacht were there as representatives
of the economic establishment. 138 Germany would only be useful for the post-World War
II Western alliance if recovery from near industrial collapse and economic destruction
were reversed. The only way to accomplish this would be to overlook, or at least
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minimize, the responsibility that German industrialists, such as Gustav and Alfried von
Krupp or those at I.G. Farben, had for the Third Reich. 139 The Western Allies, believing
that they had rightfully prosecuted those most responsible, were able to welcome the
newly "cleansed" West Germany as a partner in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. 140
In summary then, Nuremberg was heavily driven by the political concerns of the
victorious Allies, who were more preoccupied with documenting the Nazis'
conspiratorial rise to power and their aggressive attacks than bring individuals to justice.
To the Americans especially, the conviction of individuals was less important than
establishing incontrovertible historical proof of Nazi tyranny. 141 As a result, claims that
the IMT had a sound legal basis are questionable.
Due to the disregard of existing positive law and the failure to seek the
endorsement of the international community through a multilateral treaty, the legitimacy
of the IMT has been adversely affected by this controversial political basis. The same
cannot be said about the Hague Tribunal, whose legitimacy has been strengthened by the
lessons learned from Nuremberg. The framers of the Hague Tribunal recognized that its
legitimacy depended on an acceptance that it was rooted firmly in legality, which meant
that its establishment was in accord with commonly accepted principles of international
positive and natural law.
2. International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
With reports of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia making front page
139 None of the major industrialists served more than five years in prison. Almost all returned to their
firms' ownership in whole or in part.
140 Matthew Lippman, "The Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals in the United States: Is Justice Being
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headlines around the world by mid- 1992, the Security Council of the United Nations,
realizing the need to establish a legitimately recognized legal process that could not be
condemned in hindsight as politically biased, decided to take four steps in succession:
condemnation, publication, investigation, and, by convening an ad hoc tribunal,
punishment. 142 Though this process was bound to be time-consuming, especially in light
of the growing number of reports of atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Security
Council anticipated that these four steps would ensure legitimacy by the international
community.
As a first step, the Security Council passed Resolution 764, condemning all
atrocities as violations of international law. The resolution stressed "that persons who
commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the 1 949 Geneva Conventions are
individually responsible in respect of such breaches as serious violations of international
humanitarian law." 143
One month later, with Security Council Resolution 771, the U.N. publicized the
atrocities. "Expressing grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of
international humanitarian law occurring...within the territory of the former Yugoslavia,"
the Council called upon all states and international organizations to submit "substantiated
information" in order to document and publicize the atrocities. 144 Resolution 771
required that the Secretary-General submit a report to the Security Council summarizing
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any evidence that atrocities were being committed and recommending additional
measures that might be appropriate. In addition, the Security Council, invoking its
authority to take binding decisions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, decided that all
those concerned in the former Yugoslavia and all military forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina
would be subject to the resolution, and warned that noncompliance would result in the
adoption of further measures. 145
International publicity and demands for immediate condemnation of ethnic
cleansing in the late summer and early fall of 1992 prevented the Council from waiting
for these reports. Instead, going a step further, it passed Security Council Resolution 780,
an impartial Commission of Experts to investigate violations of international law. Within
four months of its establishment, the Kalshoven Commission of Experts concluded that
grave breaches and other violations of international humanitarian law had been
committed in the former Yugoslavia. The Commission defined the relatively new term of
"ethnic cleansing," in the context of the Yugoslav conflict, as "rendering an area
ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given
groups from the area." 146 It concluded that ethnic cleansing had been carried out "by
means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape
and sexual assault, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal,
displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats
of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property." 147 The
Commission further concluded that the policy and practices of ethnic cleansing described
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above constituted crimes against humanity, could be assimilated to specific war crimes,
and could also constitute the crime of genocide as defined in the Genocide Convention. 148
The hope was that the findings reached by this international panel of experts
would be recognized as impartial and therefore acknowledged as legitimate by a
preponderance of the international community. 149 Most importantly, the Commission
concluded, and the Security Council later concurred, that the situation in the former
Yugoslavia was a "conflict of international character" and therefore subject to the
international laws of armed conflict. 150 Furthermore, to avoid the entanglements of
Nuremberg, the Commission took the view that a tribunal should not deal with claims of
aggression or legitimacy of the use of force, but only with conduct in connection with the
jus in bello and other violations of international humanitarian law.
Finally, on February 22, 1993, Security Council Resolution 808 announced the
fourth step: punishment through due process of law through the creation of an
international tribunal to prosecute those who had violated international humanitarian law
in the former Yugoslavia. In the same resolution, the Security Council requested that the
Secretary-General prepare a report "on all aspects of this matter, including specific
proposals and, where appropriate, options for the effective and expeditious
implementation of [this decision], taking into account suggestions put forward in this
regard by member states." 151
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The report to the Secretary-General was prepared on the basis of existing positive
and natural law, taking into account the views expressed by interested states and
organizations on the various legal issues relating to the Tribunal. 152 Established by the
unanimously approved Security Council Resolution 827, the International Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia has as its sole purpose the prosecution of "persons responsible for
serious violations of international law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
since 1 99 1." 153
The Security Council took careful legal steps in dealing with the atrocities in the
former Yugoslavia, exhausting all alternatives before implementing Chapter VII. With
Nuremberg in mind at each stage, there was understandable concern that the Council not
be seen by the international community as unnecessarily intruding upon state sovereignty
or stepping outside the bounds of accepted international legal practices. This concern
was driven home when several states and legal commentators urged the Council to
consider using a consensual mechanism — either an international treaty or a General
Assembly resolution— to establish the tribunal. 154 In the context of the situation in the
former Yugoslavia, however, a treaty approach had several disadvantages, including the
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assigning to the International Tribunal the task of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of
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time required for negotiation and conclusion in a multilateral setting, the additional time
required to attain the necessary ratifications for its entry into force and, in particular, the
absence of any guarantee that the states concerned would become parties to the treaty. 155
The Hague's proponents countered that provisions for consent outside of the
narrow membership of the Security Council were purposely built into the Tribunal's
statute. Specifically, the U.N. General Assembly, serving as an oversight body not
present at Nuremberg, must approve the Tribunal's budget, and thus approve its mandate
and, in effect, its statute. The General Assembly, not the Security Council, elects the
judges (eleven, with no two judges being nationals from the same state). Unlike the
Allies at Nuremberg, the members of the Security Council recognize that they are not
competent to sit in judgment of alleged perpetrators, since they constitute, in essence, a
political entity. Instead, the Security Council established a separate independent judicial
body to apply the principles of individual criminal responsibility. Furthermore, the
Hague Tribunal's authority to issue mandatory orders is limited to the transfer of indicted
individuals and to other forms of judicial assistance. States retain the right to start and
complete their own judicial proceedings against those who violate international
humanitarian law and may follow their own domestic processes in complying with the
Tribunal's orders. Perhaps most important, the Hague Tribunal, unlike the IMT, is
accountable to the defendants, who are not prohibited from requesting that a judgment be
appealed. 156
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Though critics have expressed serious doubt as to whether Chapter VII is broad
enough for the Security Council to establish international tribunals, 157 the legality of the
Chapter VII basis for the Hague Tribunal has been justified by reference to the exhaustion
of a wide range of alternative remedies, ranging from condemnation to embargo to air
strikes, attempted by NATO, the United States, and United Nations in the face of
continuing atrocities in the region. Prosecution by an ad hoc tribunal was thus viewed as
the only option following the failure of the previously established legal criteria of
condemnation, publication, and investigation. 158 Finally, in a detailed report 159 issued
May 3, 1993, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali insisted that implementation of a tribunal
through Chapter VII "would be legally justified both in terms of the object and purpose of
the decision...and past Security Council practice" and "that the conflict in the region
constitutes a threat to international peace and security;" that "all parties involved in said
conflict are bound to comply with international humanitarian law;" and that the
"establishment of a war crimes tribunal would contribute to the restoration of
international peace and security by ending violations of human rights." The Statute of the
International Tribunal's legal basis with regard to Chapter VII and to previous resolutions
157
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thus justifies its creation by the Security Council.
B. FRAMEWORK OF APPLICABLE LAW
The second major difference between the two tribunals concerns the framework of
applicable law, or "victors' justice," as some commentators have called it. As with the
political basis of establishment, the precedents of international law employed by the
framers of Nuremberg fall short of providing an acceptable model for the Hague
Tribunal. The authors of the Nuremberg Charter were widely perceived, at the time and
more so since, as having breached fundamental principles of international legality. The
success of Nuremberg was thereby tarnished by the application of ex postfacto laws and
by allegations of judicial partiality derived from "victors' justice." 160 Unlike the
prosecution of the Nazi war criminals, the application of international law to the former
Yugoslavia does not involve a vanquished nation or the administration of justice by an
occupying power. 161 The war in the former Yugoslavia ended not by force leading to
surrender, but through diplomacy resulting in a negotiated and nominally agreed upon
settlement at Dayton. 162 As a result, there most likely will be no charges that a
conquering power has used its political and military dominance to manipulate the existing
international legal structure. Though this, combined with codifications of international
laws and precedents established since Nuremberg, has made the challenge to the Hague
Tribunal in this respect less daunting, hurdles still confront the Hague Tribunal's
prosecutors, since these very codifications will make it much more difficult to indict and
160
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convict suspected war criminals in the former Yugoslavia.
1. Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
"The principle of 'victor's justice' is best expressed in the maxim nullem crime
sine lege, nulla poena sine lege, the essence of which is that there can be no crime and
subsequently no punishment without a pre-existing law. In other words, defendants
should not be prosecuted in an ex post facto manner, on the basis of retrospective
legislation, which is precisely what occurred at Nuremberg." 163 "Was launching an
aggressive war and the commission of crimes against humanity actually criminal activity
punishable under international law, or merely sonorous phrases used by the victors to
cloak their purging of Nazi Germany? Under what law then could prosecution occur?" 164
International prohibitions on waging aggressive wars and crimes against humanity were
so ambiguous that an extremely liberal interpretation would have been required for the
indictment and prosecution of war criminals. Undaunted by the lack of any significant
law or precedents, the judges and prosecutors at Nuremberg interpreted existing law
loosely or "invented" the guidelines they deemed necessary to prosecute the accused,
thereby ensuring "victor's justice." The lack of any internationally recognized foundation
in positive law severely damaged the legitimacy of Nuremberg.
Many problems were the product of negotiators being guided by their own legal
conceptions and the experiences of their respective legal systems: the common law
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adversarial system as it had evolved differently in England and in the United States and
variations of the civil law inquisitorial system of Russia and France. 165 The result was a
blended system of justice that was questionable as an international legal standard and
nearly impossible for those charged to defend against. Defense attorneys were thus
hampered in their efforts to mount a credible defense for their clients.
The incorporation of the Anglo-American judicial concept of conspiracy or
common plan was patently novel under international law. The United States insisted that
the leaders, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiracy to commit any war crimes listed under Article VI of the
Nuremberg Charter were responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution
of such plan. This charge permitted the Allied prosecutors to reach members of various
Nazi organizations who otherwise would have escaped indictment. Through the charge
of conspiracy, the IMT would be able to indict members of the Reich Cabinet, along with
the upper strata of the S.A., S.S., S.D., Gestapo, NSDAP Leadership Corps, and the
General Staff. 166 This could in turn be used by the occupation courts to hold low-level
members of such organizations criminally liable simply on the basis of membership since
their active participation would be sufficient to establish guilt. 167 Justice Jackson pointed
out that acceptance of charges of conspiracy would permit the efficient trial and
conviction of thousands of suspected war criminals. 168 The intent was also to convict the
Nazis for atrocities that occurred before the outbreak of war— especially acts against the
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German Jews. While these acts could not be tried as war crimes per se, they could be
punishable as initial steps in a conspiracy to commit war crimes once the war began.
French as well as Russian framers were hesitant to accept this proposal, since the
Anglo-American concept of conspiracy was not recognized in any of the continental
European or common law legal systems. The French and Russians, though puzzled by
the concept of a common plan or conspiracy, under increasing political pressure from the
United States reluctantly acquiesced, but while insisting that any charges of conspiracy be
restricted only to Article VI(a), crimes against peace.
Other examples of questionable incorporation of retrospective law were the
assigning of criminal responsibility to not only individuals, but to heads of states. 169
Nuremberg opponents have argued that heads of states act on behalf of their
governments, and thus should be held accountable only to the laws of that state. They
may be morally "responsible to mankind" but in previously held American views, they
had no such legal responsibility. 170 Legally a head of state exercises sovereign rights
conferred upon him by those he governs, as their leader, it is to them that he is legally
responsible. 171 The framers of the IMT argued the opposite.
The existence of retrospective justice is also evident from the adoption of Article
VI(c), crimes against humanity, that the United States radically changed its position from
the one it took following World War I, "that crimes against the laws of humanity" did
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not exist in positive international law. 172 No legal development took place between 1919
and 1 945 that could have explained this change of position. Again, politics drove the
law.
173
The most often criticized application of ex post facto justice applied to the
Nuremberg defendants related to the charges of waging an aggressive war. Described in
Article VI(a) of the Nuremberg Charter as "crimes against peace," the aggressive war
charge provides the clearest evidence that accepted legal principles were subordinated to
the political interests of the Allies. Conviction under charges of waging an aggressive
war or crimes against peace as specified in the Charter was especially important to the
United States. Given the human misery resulting from Nazi aggressions Justice Jackson,
among others, found charges of war crimes based only on how the war had been
conducted insufficient. 174 "It was necessary also to impose individual punishment for
aggressive war, the supreme evil and the generating cause of most other offenses, and
their attendant agonies." 175
The United States, through the Stimson Plan, identified the outlawing of
aggressive war as a principal objective of the trial. Together with the United Kingdom,
the United States viewed the aggressive war charge as providing the justification for
expanding the Tribunal's criminal jurisdiction to encompass acts against civilians, acts
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which would otherwise fall within Germany's domestic jurisdiction. 176 The fear of
American and British statesmen was that any German prosecution would mirror
Germany's half-hearted and unsuccessful attempts of the trials following World War I.
Therefore these crimes needed to be included under the jurisdiction of the IMT.
However, this objective required a new legal framework because of the confused and
uncertain state of existing international law. 177 As stated, international prohibitions on
waging aggressive wars and crimes against humanity had not yet been invented, or as in
the cases of the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919), the Locarno Pact (1925), and
the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), were so vague that an extremely liberal interpretation
would have been required. 178 For example, though Kellogg-Briand, which had been
signed by sixty-three nations, including Germany, had "condemned recourse to war" and
renounced it, and pledged that the resolution of disputes would involve only "pacific
means," it had not gone so far as to declare aggressive war a crime or spell out the
penalties for its violation.
Citing Kellogg-Briand, which had renounced war as an instrument of national
policy, the architects of Nuremberg, led by Secretary of War Stimson and Justice
.
T
ckson, established that if one state acts aggressively by invading another state, it must
be acting unlawfully. Consequently its acts of war in the invaded country should be
considered murder and assault under that country's domestic law. The drafters of the
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Nuremberg Charter argued that, since the Nazis were cognizant of the fact that their
actions were contrary to both existing positive and natural law as documented in
agreements such as Kellogg-Briand, any attempt by the defendants to protest the
imposition of ex post facto justice would be without merit. It is doubtful whether the
states that agreed to Kellogg-Briand believed that they were, in effect, waiving the right
of state defense and exposing their civilian and military leaders to criminal liability and
prosecution. The Tribunal escaped this dilemma by ruling that the pact had to be
interpreted in light of the dynamic nature of international law. Yet, it is difficult to
discover any consistent practice supporting the Tribunal's determination that an
aggressive war constituted an international crime. As one observer noted, "no
performance at all would seem to indicate no custom at all." 179 "The argument that
treaties may be interpreted in light of evolutionary developments introduces an
impermissible degree of uncertainty and discretion into the interpretation of treaties,
particularly when extending their language to impose criminal liability." 180 It can be
argued that the U.S. Congress would not have ratified a treaty if they had even the
remotest of idea that it would expose American political and military leaders to potential
international penal liability in the event that, if America started a war, the treaty could be
reasonably interpreted as giving one or a combination of European states the power to try
Americans for the "crime of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression." 181
Should the United States not assume the same for Germany?
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Nonetheless, Jackson insisted that the principle of retroactive punishment, if
properly understood, did not preclude punishment in the circumstances involved. 182 He
cited as further evidence the fact that Adolf Hitler himself recognized the unlawfulness of
waging an aggressive war. In an address to the Reichstag, Hitler indicated that the Poles
had illegally launched a war of aggression and that the Nazis had only acted in self-
defense. 183
The logic of Jackson's arguments was again challenged by the French and the
Soviets. The Soviets insisted that only a truly internationally recognized organization
could decide if there was criminality involved in waging an aggressive war. In reality,
Stalin was concerned that the charge of aggressive war could be applied to the USSR's
carving up of Poland or its attack against Finland in 1940. 184
The French, though believing that the merits of the charge were morally and
politically desirable, agreed with their Russian counterparts and argued that this charge
would not stand up to scrutiny in the international arena. 185 The French contended that
while an aggressive state may agree to compensate an aggrieved state, as Germany was
required to do following World War I, there were no internationally recognized laws
against aggressive warfare. Furthermore, international law did not generally limit a
182
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state's use of force or recognize a just war doctrine. 186 Professor Andre Gros, a French
Representative to the United Nations War Crimes Commission, argued that the charge
had no basis in international law or custom that it was "a creation by four people who are
just four individuals— defined by those four people as criminal violations of law. Those
acts have been known for years before and have not been declared criminal violations of
international law. It is ex postfacto legislation."
187
Despite French and Russian objections, support for the inclusion of this charge
against the Nazis by President Truman and Justice Jackson, was unwavering. The
Americans wanted to win the trial on the ground that the actions of the Nazis were illegal,
whereas the French and the Russians merely wanted to prove that the Nazis were
"bandits" who should be punished for atrocities, murders, and mass executions. 188
Despite the lack of any recognizable international legal precedents, the strength of the
United States political will, combined with Justice Jackson's threat that the United States
would unilaterally try war criminals in its custody, eventually coerced the French and
Russians into concession. 189 As a result, crimes against peace was incorporated into
Article VI(a) of the Nuremberg Charter and applied retroactively to cover the planning
and waging of aggressive war by the Nazis.
The first line of defense employed by the Allies in the face of criticism of the
imposition of ex post facto law was that because of the Germany's unconditional
surrender, they had acquired sovereign legislative power over the country. Sir David
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325.
188 Minutes of the Conference Session, July 25, 1945, Jackson, State Department Publication 3080, 376,
383-384.
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Maxwell Fyfe, a Tribunal member from Great Britain, stated that, "We [the Allies]
declare what international law is....[T]here won't be any discussion on whether it is
international law or not." 190 The Allies implied that due to the severity and near global
scope of the atrocities committed by Germany, they "did not need to trouble themselves
about the state of pre-existing law." 191 But the Tribunal members knew that this would
not be an acceptable explanation. Its framers, recognizing the criticism of the application
of ex post facto laws, looked to lessen accusations of the IMT being little more than
"show trials" by suggesting that "The [Charter] was not an arbitrary exercise of power on
the part of victorious nations, but... the expression of international law existing at the time
of its creation; and to that extent is itself a contribution to international law." 192 In
hindsight, even Telford Taylor, who has been selectively critical of the IMT, recognized
that the accusation of "victor's justice" may not necessarily have been fully justified.
"The ex postfacto problem is not a bothersome question if we keep in mind that this is a
political decision to declare and apply a principle of international law." 193
However, for all the criticism directed at the application of ex post facto justice,
with respect to the count of crimes against peace, Nuremberg focused not just on the
offenses of the Third Reich, but also on establishing a precedent designed to deter and
punish aggression in the future.
2. International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Though charges of aggressive warfare and crimes against peace are not an issue,
189
Ibid., 384.
190 Minutes of the Conference Session, July 29, 1945, Jackson, State Department Publication 3080, 97, 99.
191 Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg, 155.
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the statutes of the Hague Tribunal make perfectly clear that complaints similar to
Nuremberg's use of ex post facto legislation will not resurface. 194 The legitimacy of the
Hague Tribunal is based on both conventional and customary law rather than the rights of
belligerents to enforce the laws of war. 195 In his commentary on the Statute approved by
the United Nations Security Council for the creation of the Hague Tribunal, Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali, reflecting on the Nuremberg criticisms, stated that the principle
nullem crime sine lege requires that "the international Tribunal should apply rules of
international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that
the problem of adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions does not
arise." He stated further that "part of conventional international humanitarian law which
has beyond doubt become part of international customary law" 196 is embodied in the
codification of laws as the result not only of the Charter of the IMT and the subsequent
Nuremberg Principles, but also of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the
Protection of War Victims; the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto of October 18, 1907, and
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December
192
Excerpt from the Nuremberg Judgment, 1946. See Colwill, "From Nuremberg to Bosnia," 119.
193
Taylor, The Anatomy ofthe Nuremberg Trials, 5 1
.
194 Crimes against peace were omitted from the Hague Tribunal, since their inclusion would almost
inevitably require the Tribunal to investigate the cause of the conflict itself (and the justifications issued by
the combatants), which would involve the Tribunal squarely in same type of political issues that plagued
the IMT. Instead, according to paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 808, the Tribunal shall only
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.
195 This is formally recognized in Article 99 of the Geneva Convention III, which states: "No prisoner of
war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by
international law, in force at the time the said act was committed."
196 Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Document S/25704.
69
9, 1948.
197 The legitimacy of charges against the accused in the former Yugoslavia are
specifically based on the following positive law codifications: 198
• Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is perhaps the
most important and is a combination of the four Geneva Conventions
approved following World War II. Article I expanded the jurisdiction of
international criminal law beyond acts undertaken in furtherance of a war
of aggression and established that genocide, 'whether committed in time
of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law'
;
• Violations of the law or customs of war is derived from the Hague
Convention of 1907, the Nuremberg Charter, and the 1977 Additional
Protocols. This charge is a catchall for violating international standards of
warfare, from the use of poisonous weapons to the destruction of private
property or cultural institutions not justified by military necessity;
• Genocide is also derived from a post-World War II international treaty,
the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. The charge of genocide encompasses a number of actions that
may invite the charge, but makes the defining characteristic intent. Thus,
the definition of genocide is acts committed with the intent to destroy,
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group;
• Crimes against humanity, though not yet comprehensively codified, are
derived from precedents established at Nuremberg, and include the
commission of several acts, such as killing, imprisonment, and torture,
during armed conflict against a civilian population. The charge specifically
says that the conflict can be national or international in character. This is
important because many Serbs claim the war as an internal or civil war,
not an international conflict. While this representation, if proven, can free
a defendant of some charges (such as violations of the law or customs of
war), crimes against humanity is not one of them.
While there may be other rules of customary law contained in other conventions,
the above agreements provide a sufficient basis with respect to the alleged crimes.
Though an unarguable internationally accepted precedent in both positive and natural law
197 See U.N. Document S/25704, Section II, paragraphs 31-55; Bland "Parallels, Problems and Prospects,"
9-13; and Lippman, "Nuremberg: Forty-Five Years Later," 48-52 for emphasis.
198
"The Tribunal and the Law," http://www.courttv.com/casefiles/warcrimes/reports/tribunal.html. See
also Morris and Scharf, An Insiders Guide, Volume I, 64-68.
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has been established in the wake of Nuremberg, an initial issue of primary concern, as
Bland points out, was whether the international agreements signed by the SFRY were
binding on the states created by its dissolution, namely Croatia, Slovenia, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The SFRY
ratified the 1948 Genocide Convention, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Laws
of War and the Additional Protocols I and II, the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural
Property, and the 1984 Torture Convention. However, accession to treaties ratified by
predecessor states is ordinarily not automatic except in relation to those treaties that
involve pre-existing international boundaries. Nonetheless, it is not without precedent
that all successor states are presumed to accept the international humanitarian legal
obligations of their predecessor states, despite no such existing binding requirement.
More concrete support is found in a series of negotiations concluded in May 1 992
as Croatia, Serbia, and all entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina agreed to be bound by the
obligations of the former Yugoslavia under the four Geneva Conventions and accepted
the "Statement of Principles" issued by the London Conference on Yugoslavia on August
26, 1992, "concerning compliance with international humanitarian law and personal
responsibility for violations of the conventions." 199
Bland argues that today the principle of individual responsibility under
international humanitarian law for serious human rights violations is generally accepted,
as is the list of treaty and customary provisions that defines war crimes and crimes
against humanity. Punishment by the ex postfacto application of law is thus not an issue
199 Meron, "The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia," 129. For a more thorough elucidation, see
Jordan J. Paust, "Applicability of International Criminal Laws to Events in the Former Yugoslavia," The
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for the Hague Tribunal. However, though able to avoid the criticism of "victor's justice,"
the Hague Tribunal confronts challenges absent from Nuremberg.
First, despite agreed upon criteria on what constitutes breaches of international
humanitarian law by all involved states, if suspects do not voluntarily turn themselves in
or are not handed over by their governments, it does not matter how far beyond reproach
the Hague Tribunal is to Nuremberg's ex post facto justice. Unlike the IMT, the Hague
Tribunal is endowed with only minimal authority to punish. With no power to enforce an
order to arrest suspects, those who have been indicted and fail to turn themselves in face
little risk, since, in contrast to Nuremberg, there will be no trials in abstentia. The Hague
Tribunal is hampered by a lack of cooperation of the states involved. Although Belgrade
is a party to the Dayton Accords, it has not surrendered war criminals under its de facto
control to the Tribunal. Serbia and Montenegro explicitly refuses to extradite indicted
war criminals on the grounds that it claims not to possess the necessary domestic
legislation for extradition to The Hague. Croatia also refuses to cooperate and, aside
from General Tihomir Blaskic's voluntary appearance at The Hague, and the recent
extradition of Saso Aleksouski, none of the indictees residing in Croatia has been
extradited. None of the forty-eight publicly indicted war criminals residing in Serbian
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been turned over to The Hague. 200 In fact, the Pale
government has openly declared that it has no intention of cooperating with the Tribunal,
yet it is subject to no international sanction. President Biljana Plavsic has frequently
pointed out that the Bosnian Serb Constitution bans extradition and that her government
American University Journal ofInternational Law and Policy (winter 1 994).
00 See "Bringing War Criminals to Justice: Obligations, Options, Recommendations," University ofDayton
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will not turn over Karadzic, Mladic, or any other indictees to the Hague Tribunal201 and
the ability to apprehend violators is doubtful as the mandate of IFOR/SFOR makes
soldiers reluctant to seize suspects.
Second, what is suppose to distinguish the Hague Tribunal from the IMT is, that
in theory, the former is supposed to try all defendants, not just the major political and
military leaders. However, trying all accused is more difficult than was first envisioned.
Identifying the defendants to be prosecuted by Nuremberg was relatively simple: those
individuals indicted by the victors had been selected from the top leadership of the Nazi
regime and represented all of the organizations labeled criminal in the indictment itself. 202
With suspects numbering in the thousands, the majority of those charged or in custody by
the Hague Tribunal are low-level figures, as many of the more culpable higher-level
civilian and military leaders have either not been indicted, or if indicted, are not in
custody. Former Prosecutor Richard Goldstone has justified the failure to focus on
military and political leaders this way: "Our strategy includes the investigation of lower-
level persons directly involved in carrying out the crimes in order to build effective cases
against the military and civilian leaders who were party to the overall planning and
organization of those crimes."203 Yet, given its limited resources and the fact that the
Hague Tribunal has only two courtrooms to try cases, this prosecution strategy has come
under implicit criticism by the Inspector General of the United Nations. In a February
Centerfor International Programs, located at http://www.nesl.edu/center/warcriml.html.
201 Gary J. Bass, "Courting Disaster, The U.N. Goes Soft on Bosnia. Again.," The New Republic, 6
September 1993, 12.
202
Harris, "A Call for an International War Crimes Court," p. 245. See also Smith, Reaching Judgment at
Nuremberg, 63-65, 68-71.
203
Press Statement by the Prosecutor, Justice Richard Goldstone, in Conjunction with the Announcement
of Indictments on July 25, 1995.
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1997 report focusing on the Rwanda Tribunal, yet equally applicable to the Hague
Tribunal, he concluded that the failure of the prosecutor to ensure that the limited
resources of his office were redirected to pursue key figures in the genocide "is the single
most significant failing. Unless that is corrected, the Tribunal will have been created to
little effect; the Rwandans and those in the former Yugoslavia will be justified in
suspecting that justice delayed is justice denied; and the United Nations will have failed
in its promise to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to
justice the persons who are responsible for them."204
Third, the Hague Tribunal suffers from a chronic lack of financial support.
Unlike Nuremberg, where budget constraints and limited resources were not an issue, The
Hague is forced to operate in an environment of fiscal scrutiny due to past criticisms of
bloated staffs and financial mismanagement. Though funded by a General Assembly
account, cost overruns of other U.N. actions have forced the General Assembly to rely on
voluntary contributions. Although the United States has provided more support than
other nations (totaling $18 million in the first three years of operations), the lack of
voluntary and in-kind contributions has prevented the Tribunal from carrying out little
more than a fraction of its functions and responsibilities. These limitations are reflected
in the lack of indictments issued and the small scale of the court's investigatory
operations. Fortunately, there are indications this may be changing. In a recent U.N.
press release
205
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204 See "Bringing War Criminals to Justice: Obligations, Options, Recommendations," and "Report of the
Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services," U.N. Document
A/51/789, February 6, 1997, Annex, paragraph 59.
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year's budget of $35.4 million. 206 Most of the increase would go towards funding
temporary posts to hire additional prosecutors and the building of an additional court
room and court facilities. Even if approved, it falls well short of the near limitless
budgets and staffs afforded Nuremberg.
Finally, Bland contends that the Hague Tribunal confronts an enormous task in its
quest to gather incriminating evidence for use at trial. Unlike Nuremberg, where the
Allies had the benefit of lengthy documentation and records ofNazi atrocities,207 the level
of detailed records and physical evidence in the former Yugoslavia is scarce. To make
matters worse, the Commission of Experts charged with providing evidence of violations
has a staff that is dwarfed in comparison to the hundreds of lawyers and investigators that
were available for the Nuremberg prosecution in 1945. 208 The ability to obtain evidence
has been hampered by a lack of control over areas where offenses have been committed;
blatant tampering by Serbs with files containing crucial information on atrocities
committed during the conflict; and the gathering of evidence by non-governmental
organizations, which do not always have the ability to marshal evidence for criminal
proceedings.209
Despite significant advances in positive and natural law since the trials at
Nuremberg, challenges still confront the accused, prosecutors and judges at The Hague.
Those who are anxiously awaiting mass indictments and speedy convictions, despite the
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codifications of international law and precedents established since the IMT, need to
temper their expectations.
C. SUMMARY
Supporters of the Hague Tribunal maintain that the international community has
made tremendous strides since the IMT. The shortcomings which critics often attribute
to Nuremberg have since been remedied by numerous precedents and legal codifications.
Much of that criticism concerned the unprecedented nature of the Nuremberg
proceedings, the alleged lack of judicial impartiality, and the conviction of Nazi leaders
for violating the novel legal doctrine of crimes against peace.210 Unarguably, "the ex post
facto application of Allied-formulated laws, the tenuous legal foundation for the
Tribunal's existence and authority, and the presence of judges from nations that had just
vanquished that of the defendants are all factors that have tended to diminish the validity
of the precedents established by Nuremberg."211 Supporters of the Hague Tribunal
maintain that it will not suffer from the same lack of jurisdiction and substantive
precedents that haunted Nuremberg. 212 The current tribunal draws upon several
precedents.
First, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter provides the Hague Tribunal a legal, rather
than the Nuremberg's political, foundation. Though the resolutions that established the
Hague Tribunal were ratified only by the U.N. Security Council, they have been adopted
as universally accepted and lawful resolutions that, in accordance with Article 25 of the
210 Lippman, "Nuremberg: Forty-Five Years Later," 63.
211
Bland, "Parallels, Problems and Prospects," 7.
212 James Podgers, "Repeating Nuremberg," ABA Journal, (October 1993): 121.
76
U.N. Charter, must be recognized and implemented by all states. Considerable pains
have been taken to present The Hague as a legitimate organ of the General Assembly and
one not dominated by any one nation or coalition. 213 The 1945 London Agreement, on
the other hand, though eventually recognized by nineteen other nations, had the political
backing of only the four victors.
Second, international positive and natural law has been codified since Nuremberg.
A sufficient legal basis and precedent to indict and prosecute Yugoslav war criminals
exist in the numerous conventions, protocols, and international humanitarian law
codifications adopted since Nuremberg. As the President of the Hague Tribunal, Antonio
Cassese, stated, "for the first time, the community of states is rendering a justice which is
not that of the victors... a justice animated not by a spirit of revenge, but by the
determination to bring the criminals to book and prevent further crimes."214
These differences, coupled with the marked developments in international
organizations, such as the U.N., have produced in the Hague Tribunal a judicial body
unlike the Nuremberg IMT with respect to establishment, structure, and legal basis.215
The Security Council, in establishing a legally valid and internationally recognized war
crimes tribunal to prosecute violators of international humanitarian law in the former
Yugoslavia, possesses an unprecedented opportunity to fulfill the United Nation's moral
imperative to "promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."216
213 Chaney, "Pitfalls and Imperatives," 93.
214 Statement of Antonio Cassese, President of the Tribunal, U.N. Document IT/23, January 23, 1994.
215 Chaney, "Pitfalls and Imperatives," 65.
2,6 U.N. Charter, Article 1.
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The former Yugoslavia, unfortunately, is not the sole humanitarian tragedy of this
era. The use of chemical weapons by Iraq against its Kurdish population is just as
criminal, but has gone unpunished by national and international courts. 217 The fact that
those guilty of these and other atrocities remain unaccountable for their actions during the
U.N.-declared "Decade of International Law" (1990-2000)218 suggests that the use of ad
hoc tribunals to prosecute war criminals has questionable value as a deterrent. Those
who criticize their effectiveness point to the fact that since 1919 there have been five
international investigative commissions,219 four ad hoc international criminal tribunals,220
and three internationally mandated or authorized national prosecutions221 . The fact that
tribunals and commissions have been selectively initiated has convinced those who
commit crimes against humanity that they can escape prosecution. However, a solution
may be found in the establishment of a permanent international criminal court.
The establishment of a permanent judicial body that has international jurisdiction
is an old initiative. 222 However, there is a widely held perception that the Hague Tribunal,
217 March 1988 is the first confirmed use by Saddam Hussein of chemical weapons against Kurds at
Halabja, Iraq. An estimated 5000 people were killed.
218 General Assembly Resolution 44/23, UN. Document A/44/49, 1989.
219 The 1919 Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties;
The 1943 United Nations War Crimes Commission; The 1946 Far Eastern Commission; The 1992
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 to Investigate War
Crimes and other Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia; and The 1994
Independent Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 to
Investigate Grave Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda.
220 The 1945 International Military Tribunal to Prosecute the Major War Criminals of the European
Theater; The 1946 International Military Tribunal to Prosecute the Major War Criminals of the Far East;
The 1993 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; and The 1994 International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda.
221 1921-1923 Prosecutions by the German Supreme Court Pursuant to Allied Requests Based on the Treaty
of Versailles; 1946-1955 Prosecutions by the Four Major Allies in the European Theater Pursuant to
Control Council Law No. 10; and the 1946-1951 Military Prosecutions by Allied Powers in the Far East
Pursuant to Directives of the Far Eastern Commission.
222 Though the establishment of tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have led to a renewed
interest in a permanent international criminal court, the international community has contemplated the
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depending on its success, in conjunction with the end of Cold War, may very well
provide the crucial impetus for the establishment of a permanent international criminal
court that will have cooperative jurisdiction over acts ranging from piracy and terrorism
to genocide and war crimes.
establishment of such a venue since the late 19th century. In 1895, in a proposal rejected by the Institute for
International Law, the International Red Cross recommended the creation of a permanent international
criminal court to deter violations of war. Most were unwilling to accept a world court because it was an
affront to the concept of state sovereignty.
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V. BEYOND THE HAGUE
No peace can endure long without justice. For only justice can finally
break the cycle of violence and retribution that fuels war and crimes
against humanity.
William J. Clinton (1995) 223
If some surrender of national sovereignty is involved to make it work, so
be it. We have already waited too long to institutionalize Nuremberg.
Henry King (1996)224
There have been advances in international positive law since Nuremberg.
However, it would be unrealistic to think that the tragedies brought about by wars and
human rights abuses, which have plagued the twentieth century, will disappear with these
codifications as we enter a new century. As a result, the need for a globally accepted
system ofjustice to judge individuals accused of crimes against humanity will remain. If
successful, such a permanent court could go a long way in deterring the next potential
Karadzic or Mladic. 225
A. THE END OF AD HOC TRIBUNALS?
In spite of the limited successes enjoyed by the ad hoc tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, many states question the utility and legitimacy of applying ad-
223 Remarks by the President at the Opening of the Commemoration of 50 Years After Nuremberg: Human
Rights and the Rule of Law, White House transcript, October 15, 1995.
224 King, who prepared the cases against the head of the German Army and Air Force, speaking at the 50
reunion of Nuremberg on March 23, 1996, about the proposed international criminal court. See Mike
Magan, "The Legacy of Nuremberg," The National Law Journal (April 8, 1996): A7.
225 Framers have proposed that, though the court be a permanent body, it would sit only when requested to
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hoc tribunals to future tragedies. There are several reasons why some members of the
United Nations have indicated a reluctance to continue this ad hoc approach.
The first, sometimes referred to as "tribunal fatigue," is that the process of
reaching a U.N. Security Council consensus on the tribunal's statue, electing judges,
selecting prosecutors, and appropriating funds has turned out to be politically exhausting.
Ad hoc tribunals take time to establish, during which evidence may be destroyed and
additional lives lost. The ad hoc approach does not provide the international community
with a standing mechanism that can promptly investigate and prosecute reported war
crimes and other atrocities.
Second, many of the 183 countries who do not possess permanent membership
and a veto in the Security Council, view the creation of ad hoc tribunals by the Council as
inherently unfair because the permanent members, through the use of a veto, have the
ability to shield themselves and their allies from the jurisdictions of such tribunals. These
states contend that the ad hoc approach to the enforcement of international criminal law is
therefore politicized.
Third, with regard to the rarity with which ad hoc tribunals have been convened
by the international community, as well as the variability of their jurisdictional structures,
there is no predictability in the ad hoc approach, and thus, no effective deterrent.
The final reason ad hoc tribunals are viewed by many as ineffective concerns
judicial independence, which is the principal guarantee of the rule of law. As a safeguard
of judicial impartiality, it helps ensure the fair adjudication of the rights and claims at
stake in any given case - that is, the right to a fair trial. The incompatibility between
hear a specific case in an effort to reduce costs.
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temporarily constituted judicial bodies and judicial independence is widely
acknowledged: simply put, courts that are impermanent are too vulnerable to political
manipulation, including outright termination, to be truly independent.226
B. FUTURE INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
A permanent international criminal court, created by a multilateral treaty, is thus
hailed by the majority of countries in the United Nations as a solution to the problems
that plague the ad hoc approach. As a result, in December 1 994 the General Assembly
adopted a resolution providing for the creation of an intercessional committee, open to all
member states, which met twice in 1995 to review a draft statute for an international
criminal court (ICC),227 completed in 1994 by the International Law Commission (ILC),
and to consider arrangements for the convening of an international conference of
plenipotentiaries to adopt the statute. 228 After years of multinational working groups, a
diplomatic conference has been scheduled to meet in Rome in June 1998 for interested
states to finalize and sign a multilateral treaty establishing the ICC. 229 The international
criminal court will have jurisdiction over the three so-called core crimes - genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity - and possibly jurisdiction over a number of so-
called treaty crimes such as acts of terrorism, drug trafficking,230 and aggression.231 As
226 Bradley E. Berg, "The 1994 Draft Statue for an International Criminal Court: A Principle Appraisal of
Jurisdictional Structure," Case Western Reserve Journal ofInternational Law (spring 1996): 238-241.
227 The 60-article ILC Draft Statue details the establishment of the court; its relationship to the United
Nations; composition and administration; jurisdiction and applicable law; investigation and advancement
of prosecution; trial; appeal and review; international cooperation and judicial assistance; and enforcement.
228 General Assembly Resolution 49/53, U.N. GAOR 49th Session, U.N. Document A/49/53, 1994. See
also Scharf, "The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court," 170.
229 General Assembly Resolution 51/207, U.N. GAOR, 51 st Session, U.N. Document A/51/207, 1996.
230 With respect to treaty-based crimes such as terrorism and drug trafficking, many states, including the
U.S., claim the ICC would not be equipped to adequately adjudicate them. They point to the sensitive
nature of the information involved in, for example, terrorism investigations, as well as their complexity and
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with all international treaties, once the statute is adopted, it must be ratified by each
government. Many states would like to see the treaty for the ICC come into force by
1999, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the First International Peace
Conference. 232
A key point still being argued is how such cases would be presented for
acceptance by the ICC. Some states, notably those in Asia, want to be able to petition the
court themselves. Others, especially those in Europe and Latin America, favor a system
where a group of international prosecutors would have the authority to petition the court.
The U.S. and China want wide latitude for the Security Council to commence actions. 233
C. PAST ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH THE ICC
The idea of a permanent international criminal court, though receiving a great deal
of momentum from the establishment of tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
has been debated throughout the twentieth century, especially in the post-Nuremberg era.
Nuremberg, in bringing forth the principle of individual responsibility, raised the hopes
of many that it would set a lasting precedent with the establishment of a permanent
international judicial body. As such, attempts immediately after World War II and
throughout the Cold War produced at least six proposals for the establishment of a
long duration. See Jelena Pejic "What is an International Criminal Court?" Human Rights, Volume 23:4
(fall 1996).
231
Stoelting, David., "International Courts Flourish in the 1990s; Nations Cede Authority," New York Law
Journal (August 4, 1997): 52. See also Christopher K. Hall, "Current Development: The First Two
Sessions of the United Nations Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court," American Journal of International Law (January 1997). Crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICJ
are listed in Article 20 of the ILC Draft Statue.
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It is expected that the ICC will be located in The Hague, the site of the International Court of Justice and
the ad-hoc Hague and Rwanda Tribunals.
2,1
A11 agree that the ICC would have automatic or "inherent" jurisdiction over genocide whenever a state
party to the statute is also a party to the Genocide Convention.
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permanent international criminal court, including the Sottile Proposal (1951), the United
Nations Draft Statue (1953), the International Law Association Proposal (1982), the
Bassiouni Proposal (1987), the Siracusa Proposal (1990), and the American Bar
Association Proposal (1991).234
Despite tremendous advances, though questionable in an international legal sense,
made by the rulings at Nuremberg, the reality of the Cold War environment prevented
adoption of any proposal for the establishment of a permanent court. Though many
countries believed that an international criminal court was desirable in theory, the failure
of the world's major powers to support the idea doomed its creation.235 Political and
military confrontations between the East and West spilled over into the international legal
arena, as numerous commissions of international jurists were unable to reach agreement
on basic tenets, such as jurisdiction, an acceptable code of crimes, or a definition of what
constitutes aggression.
236 Both the Soviet Union and the United States believed that their
sovereignty would be affected by the establishment of such a court and were not prepared
to accept such a submission during the height of the Cold War. Therefore the effort,
which held so much promise immediately following Nuremberg, lapsed into desuetude
for the next thirty-five years.
Though the Cold War severely hindered the codification process, progress has
234
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235 France was the only permanent member of the Security Council willing to support the establishment of
an international criminal court.
236 Defining aggression proved to be difficult. The General Assembly appointed a Special Committee on
the Question of Defining Aggression (1952-1954), then a second Committee (1954-1957) , and then a third
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finally completed its task in 1974 and the General Assembly adopted the definition of aggression by a
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occurred since 1989. With improving relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States, work on an international criminal court resumed in 1990 when the General
Assembly requested the ILC to address the "question of establishing an international
criminal court or other international criminal trial mechanism with jurisdiction over
persons alleged to have committed crimes which may be covered under...the Draft Code
of Crimes."237 The ILC provisionally adopted a Draft Code of Crimes in 1991 and 1992
and created a working group on an international criminal court. The ILC working group
produced an extensive report outlining the general basis upon which, in its opinion, the
establishment of such a court could proceed. The proposals represented a compromise
between those who would have gone much further and those who felt that nothing should
be done at all. With one exception,238 the proposals, which were largely based on the
work of the 1951 Sottile Proposal and the 1953 United Nations Draft Statue, were
adopted in the 1994 ILC Draft Statute. 239
Though many in the international community expects that this court will be
operational with the dawn of a new millennium, the efforts currently being conducted by
the U.N. working groups framing its establishment are monumental, as they must ensure
that widely-accepted legal principles form the bedrock of establishment. The
shortcomings experienced by ad hoc tribunals or in previous attempts to establish a
permanent international judicial body must be avoided. To be recognized as legitimate
consensus resolution. See General Assembly Resolution 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Session, U.N. Document
A/9631, 1974.
237 The resolution was introduced by a coalition of sixteen Caribbean and Latin American nations who were
concerned with the problem of extraditing and prosecuting international narco-terrorists. General
Assembly Resolution 44/39, U.N. GAOR, 44th Session, U.N. Document A/44/39, 1989.
8
Article 20 of the 1994 Draft contains a more expansive notion of the Court's jurisdiction than was
originally proposed.
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the United Nations has ensured that several significant principles were integrated in the
1994 Draft Statue. 240
First, individual criminal responsibility, which was greatly clarified and
strengthened as a legal principle in the Charter and judgment of the IMT at Nuremberg,
must remain the preeminent principle of international criminal law. To be effective, an
international criminal court must focus on deterring individuals from committing crimes
against humanity. Though not specifically spelled out,241 the Draft Statute nonetheless
reaffirms the judgments reached at Nuremberg— that crimes against international law
are committed by men, not abstract entities, and that only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced. 242 Though the
Draft Statute imposes criminal responsibility for individuals, it does not dismiss the
responsibilities of states. International forums other than an international criminal court,
notably the Security Council or International Court of Justice, are more suited to
addressing the wrongful acts of states. 243 Second, the Draft Statute recognizes the
concept of non-retroactivity. A person cannot be charged with an offense unless that
offense existed in law at the time of the act. 244 Finally, the decision to use a multilateral
treaty, instead of a Security Council Resolution, to establish the ICC, ensures that states
239 Wexler, "The Proposed International Criminal Court: An Appraisal," 684-685.
240
Berg, "The 1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court: A Principle Appraisal of
Jurisdictional Structure," 230-260.
241
Restricting jurisdiction to natural persons is an assumption that runs throughout the Draft Statute.
Specific mention of individual criminal responsibility can be found in U.N. Working Group Document
A/AC.249/1997/WG.2/CRP.2, February 13, 1997.
242 IMT Judgment, 466-467.
243 Attaching criminal responsibility to non-individual actors would raise numerous practical problems,
particularly with respect to the likelihood of voluntary state accession and eventual enforcement. More
importantly, the principles and objectives that underpin international criminal law flow directly from legal
rights held by individuals, not states or organizations.
244 ILC Draft Statue, Part 5, Article 39.
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besides the major powers have input into the structures and jurisdiction of the court.
As is evident from these principles, the United Nations has taken the necessary
steps to ensure that a majority of states should ratify the treaty that establishes the ICC.
Despite growing support for the establishment of an international criminal court, some
countries remain deeply opposed to its establishment, or at least the way it has been
currently proposed. These states argue that if the court is unsuccessful, its ineffectiveness
will undermine the international legal order its creation seeks to bolster. Others contend
that the court could make peace impossible. When hostilities are over and both sides are
ready to shake hands, it is possible that lawyers would begin a war of accusation, counter-
accusation, and recrimination, thereby rendering any chance at peace difficult. 245
However, the greatest challenge to the court's establishment comes from members
of the Security Council, notably the United States and China. Both countries insist that
the Security Council should be the arbiter of which cases should go to the international
court, a view at odds with that of nearly all other countries. These powers believe that
Washington and Beijing would use their influence to choose which cases they would
allow the court to hear, thus limiting the independence of the international court
prosecutor. China has increasingly expressed concern about the creation of the ICC,
perhaps out of fear that its own human rights abuses might be subjected to jurisdiction.
Therefore, they wish to reserve the right to veto any actions taken against their internal
conduct. As for the United States, its opposition to any process outside the Security
Council's initiation of criminal proceedings arises from a fear that U.S. military
personnel, who are called upon to rescue hostages, protect Americans overseas, conduct
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peacekeeping operations, and engage in anti-terrorist activities will be subjected by
disgruntled states to prosecution by the ICC. "It would not surprise me at all if Libya, as
treaty partner to this statute, will file regular, perhaps weekly complaints against officials
not only in the United States, but of other countries for strictly political reasons."246 As a
result, ratification by the U.S. Senate may be difficult.247
Though these hurdles are formidable, if there is the necessary political will to
establish a court, they are far from insurmountable. In light of the debate over triggering
mechanisms, the U.S. position appears to be evolving. President Clinton and David
Scheffer have proposed that the Security Council be given authority to refer an entire
situation to the court — the situation in the former Yugoslavia, for example — after
which the international prosecutors of the ICC would have wide latitude to decide which
specific cases would be tried.
D. CONCLUSION
President Clinton declared that "nations all around the world who value freedom
and tolerance [should] establish a permanent international court to prosecute, with
support of the... Security Council, serious violations of international law." A permanent
international court "would be the ultimate tribute to the people who did such important
work at Nuremberg."248 Though the establishment of a permanent international criminal
court to judge crimes against humanity has been a goal that has eluded the United Nations
245 Wexler, "The Proposed International Criminal Court: An Appraisal," 666, 672.
246 David Scheffer, ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues, quoted in "Global Justice Edges Closer:
Creation of International Criminal Court Under Negotiation," ABA Journal (November 1997).
247
"yhis is me most politically charged issue.... [I]t is conceivable" that Washington would not sign a
treaty that failed to keep intact its veto power. Scheffer, quoted in "U.S. May Nix Plan for U.N. Tribunal;
Wants to be able Protect Citizens," The Washington Times, 22 October 1997, Al.
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since its establishment, the end of the Cold War has allowed attention to be focused on
atrocities that in previous times would have been ignored. "Legal accountability, if
consistently applied, would surely bring about much of the good on an international scale
that it does domestically, in terms of deterrence, rehabilitation of the victims of crime,
retribution for the criminal act, and upholding of the principles of justice and law."249
The creation of a permanent international criminal court might go a long way toward
ensuring these principles.
The punishment of those convicted at Nuremberg legitimized the process of
international criminalization of certain conduct and raised expectations about a new era o.
justice and the rule of law in international relations. 250 Many nations in the post-World
War II community made a significant effort to codify the precedents established in
international law beyond the Nuremberg Principles by attempting to create a world
criminal court. The realities of East-West confrontations dictated otherwise and the lack
of political consensus relegated the most obvious organ of international justice, the
United Nations, fairly impotent. "As a result, since the end of World War II the
international legal community lurched from crisis to crisis in an attempt to develop and
adjudicate international criminal law."251
Nearly fifty years later the stage was set again in Europe to judge those accused of
war crimes and genocidal practices. Recognizing the shortcomings that occurred at
Nuremberg, the framers of the Hague Tribunal took the unprecedented steps of ensuring
48 David J. Scheffer, "International Judicial Intervention," Foreign Policy, (spring 1997): 50.
249 Wexler, "The Proposed International Criminal Court: An Appraisal," 665-666.
3 Timothy McCormack, "Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in International
Law," Albany Law Review, Volume 60 (1997): 729.
251
Berg, "The 1994 Draft Statue for an International Criminal Court: A Principle Appraisal of
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that prosecution of war criminals in the former Yugoslavia would be based entirely on
established internationally recognized principles. Because of this the creation of the
Hague Tribunal was a relatively long process that did not have the full support of all
states in the United Nations.
The history and record of international criminal investigative and adjudication
attempts, from the Treaty of Versailles to the Nuremberg IMT to the Hague Tribunal,
clearly demonstrate the need to establish a permanent international judicial body. "If the
lessons of the past are to instruct the course of the future, then the creation of a permanent
system of international criminal justice with a continuous institutional memory is
imperative. Such a system must be independent, fair, and effective in order to avoid past
pitfalls. Above all, it must be free from political manipulation, because compromise is
the art of politics, not ofjustice."252
Despite the strides the Hague Tribunal has made, in the absence of such a court,
not only have many atrocities gone unpunished, but almost every ad hoc tribunal and
international investigation created has suffered from some degree of politicization or the
influence of a changed geopolitical situation. 253 A permanent court with jurisdiction over
serious violations of international humanitarian law is needed and should be created. The
United States, especially the military, could benefit from its establishment as enforcing
international law in a fair and consistent manner would not only deter future war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity, but would serve as a deterrent that might reduce





and dollars, as illustrated by recent situations in Somalia and Bosnia.
" Bassiouni, "From Versailles to Rwanda," 1 1.
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